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Roy G. Spece, Jr.*

COVID-19 Control: Disrupting
Doctor-Patient Relationships
ABSTRACT
The full-armamentarium of public health countermeasures came into play
when COVID-19 emerged; a few examples are quarantine, closures, and social
distancing. These countermeasures are intended to protect population health
but trench on many important rights protected by ethical precepts and tort,
constitutional, or other law. The measures studied here, orders to delay “elective” medical procedures to preserve resources, have been virtually ignored. Yet,
they are uniquely broad, risky, and disruptive of doctor-patient relationships.
Delay also can be shoddily promulgated or implemented, thus creating tort liability. Although medicine (speaking for the few) and public health (speaking
for the many) traditionally have clashed, this article shows that medical and
public health law and ethics combine to require strict (constitutional) or stringent (medical and public health ethics) scrutiny of delay actions. This scrutiny
requires a showing that a countermeasure is necessary, effective, and the least
intrusive way to further vital governmental goals. Delay orders trench on several fundamental or special liberties. This article focuses on those as well as
the seldom-discussed fundamental right to purchase care (or insurance for it)
available in the open market. Although delay regimes can be beneficial if properly promulgated and implemented, it is unlikely that the COVID-19-related
actions can meet ethical standards or withstand constitutional strict or even
certain types of intermediate scrutiny that require the government show the
actions work or are the least restrictive alternative.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic descended on the United States in
early 2020 and the realization and shock of COVID-19 morbidity and
mortality confronted the nation, federal, state, and professional
groups began issuing orders, mandates, and recommendations for
health care providers to delay so-called elective or non-essential
health care.1 The announced purpose of this move was to conserve
1. “Orders” or “mandates” are obligatory duties created by government or professional bodies. “Recommendations” are non-obligatory guidance provided by such
bodies. Either can be used in legal, ethical, or policy analyses. Several of these
pronouncements will be discussed in Part IV. This Article’s focus is on tort liability, clinical medicine and public health ethics (including their interaction), and
constitutional law concerning the delay of so-called elective procedures. Thus, legal and ethical issues related to more often-considered pandemic countermea-
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both the healthcare workforce and resources, such as general medical
and intensive care (ICU) beds, respirators, masks, and other personal
protective equipment (PPE) to deal with COVID-19. Continuing
shortages in medical resources suggest that delay directives did not
achieve their goals and, in fact, have caused morbidity and mortality
among individual patients, severe financial damage to health care
providers, and risks to quality, cost, and access in the health care system. Beyond grave risks of mortality and morbidity, a delay directive
is also unique among countermeasures in that it disrupts physicianpatient relationships that foster proper care by familiarizing providers
with the bodies and minds of patients and by engendering vital patient trust.2 There are, moreover, several less intrusive alternatives:
obtaining voluntary delays; well-planned and -implemented guidelines for delays; setting delays within an overall comprehensive mix of
countermeasures; obtaining needed health care providers by rearranging, recruiting, conscripting, or activating; giving licenses to inactive
or unlicensed health care providers; and insofar as the federal government is involved or can be approached for cooperation, conquering
shortage of medical resources by forcing companies to mass produce
needed items.3
Primarily, this Article explores benefits and problems presented by
promulgation and implementation of delay pronouncements and, most
importantly, discusses helpful legal and ethical approaches in reconciling the interests of public health and of individual patients. This
entails: (1) examining a representative sample of early delay pronouncements; (2) discussing benefits and problems in their promulgation and implementation; (3) analyzing a hypothetical medical
malpractice case that serves as a platform for application of the concepts and principles; (4) exploring ways delay pronouncements can be
used by litigants, jurists, and policy decision-makers to advocate for or
set standards in civil law, tort, or constitutional law; and (5) considering similar manners in which medical and public health legal and ethical precepts generally can be used by the same professionals.
sures such as quarantine; isolation; social distancing; forced testing, screening,
vaccination, or treatment; stay-at-home orders; closure of all but essential public
or private activities of cities, economic sectors, or entire states unless they can be
performed at home; and limitations on travel are referenced here only insofar as
they provide insight into to the delayed care issue. Although liability and certain
constitutional provisions are discussed, the Article does not address Fourth
Amendment violations, eminent domain, statutory causes of action, or business
litigation (even if it relies on constitutional theories). Only brief reference is made
to the affiliated topics of immunities from liability and professional discipline.
2. See infra Part II. Regarding the multiple beneficial effects of patients’ trust in
their health providers, see Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 463, 478–82 (2002).
3. Hall, supra note 2. Regarding mandatory production, see the Defense Production
Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568.
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This Article employs constitutional law to analyze, defend, or undercut the use of delay pronouncements, ethical codes, literature, and
concepts. It also determines the constitutionality of delay actions
under substantive due process and equal protection by characterizing
the nature and weight of the asserted constitutional rights or interests
and the degree of intrusion on those rights (by direct effect or through
classifications) leading to a choice and application of the appropriate
standard of scrutiny. The choices among the latter range from an extremely deferential rational basis test to strict scrutiny, with several
intermediate tests between the extremes.4 This analysis shows that
constitutionally judging delay pronouncements is unique because,
first, they are perhaps the harshest and most wide-ranging pandemic
countermeasure due to the morbidity and mortality risks they pose.
Second, it is particularly difficult to choose the appropriate standard
of review. The landmark case relevant to judging public health measures—the United States Supreme Court’s 1905 Jacobson v. Massachusetts5—can be read as applying a very deferential standard akin to
the rational basis test. On the other hand, several commentators interpret it as containing several limitations that favor those challenging public health measures.6 Third, contemporary authorities either
4. Substantive due process and equal protection are based in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 727–29, 858–62 (6th ed. 2019), regarding the weight of rights or
interests, the nature of intrusions or classifications, and levels of scrutiny.
5. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
6. See, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties,
and the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L.
REV. F. 179 (2020) (suggesting that the suspension of judicial review is comparable to the substantial deference given by the courts at all levels to governmental
public health measures during emergencies as well as providing an insightful
survey of cases, constitutional doctrine, and standards of review); Jeffery D. Jackson, Tiered Scrutiny in a Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 39 (2020) (arguing that
scrutiny should not be relaxed in public health emergencies and that courts
should balance burdens on rights and public health achievements and applying
the Constitution to various countermeasures—including making abortion an
“elective” procedure—used in the current pandemic); Craig Konnoth, Narrow
Tailoring the COVID-19 Response, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 193, 206 (2020)
(“The test I propose is a causal nexus between the offsets and the burdens that
are imposed. That is, the offsets would not have been provided but for the regulatory burdens. It would not matter whether the legislation is in the same or different bill: sometimes provisions in omnibus bills are completely unrelated. And as
with the COVID-19 response, related regulatory responses may pass weeks apart
from each other.”); Michael H. Shapiro, Updating Constitutional Doctrine: An Extended Response to the Critique of Compulsory Vaccination, 12 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 87, 93–95, 103–05 (2012) (suggesting that Jacobson probably
applied a reasonable relationship test, setting forth an argument structure concerning compulsory hepatitis B vaccination of preschoolers, noting ambiguity
concerning what standard would apply in the contemporary world, and hypothesizing that a vaccination requirement would be found constitutional); Mary Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, the Constitution, and the Hepatitis B Mandate for
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argue that Jacobson is deferential and should be followed today, or
that the case is a relic of history, given the Court’s development over
the last several decades of a tiered approach to standards of review.
Those who embrace invigorated scrutiny argue that it should, but
might not, be applied in cases involving severe public health
measures.7
There should be either strict or substantially invigorated scrutiny
of governmental delay pronouncements because of ethical concerns
and because they substantially intrude on fundamental rights. As will
be discussed in section VIII.C, these rights include life, physical
health, bodily integrity, autonomy of decision-making in intimate affairs, and a right to purchase healthcare or medical insurance. This
Article focuses on delay measures because they are unique and littlestudied, even though they are one of the harshest and most wide-ranging public health measures. Although delay regimes can be helpful in
preserving vital medical resources if carefully promulgated, specific
pandemic countermeasures will not be effective unless implemented
with other public health measures, such as isolation of carriers and
quarantine of persons exposed to carriers, that comprise a sound package of public health measures. However, the current regime, in many
respects, cannot withstand strict or invigorated scrutiny—legally or
ethically. Ultimately, this Article concludes that in the context of delaying care and considering the interests of both society and individuals, governmental officials should prioritize individuals and their
physician-patient relationships, as explained in the medical literature; should interrupt that relationship only with solid justification,
coordination, communication, and care; and should have the burdens
of presenting evidence and of persuasion when its tools seriously affect physician-patient relationships or related constitutional rights.
The justification for a presumption in favor of those who oppose
delayed care is that, first, promulgation or implementation of a delay
pronouncement is, as indicated above, unique among public health
measures used to control COVID-19. This Article mentions general economic harms that government entities should consider in any ultimate decision regarding social welfare, but highlights the physical,
Infants and Young Children, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 39, 48–65,
80–84 (2012) (canvassing cases before and after Jacobson, arguing that Jacobson
applied scrutiny beyond the rational basis test, and seemingly arguing for either
strict or intermediate scrutiny); Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Theory and
Practice in the Constitutional Design, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 265 (2001) (suggesting a
sliding scale of standards of review); Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine:
The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985) (arguing intrusions must be carefully tailored and processes must comport with procedural due
process; explaining that even closer scrutiny is required when administrative actions are at issue).
7. See sources cited supra note 6.
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mental, and economic harms caused to individual patients and their
families by delay pronouncements.
A second justification for the presumption against delayed care is
that those who challenge public health measures usually lose in battles with those within the public health complex speaking for the
many. To be sure, a presumption in favor of individuals could lead to
equally drastic consequences. But there should be a checking function.
At this point of the analysis, public health refers to a coalescence of
traditional public health purposes and leanings in favor of the maximization of societal health, the powerful segment of society who readily embraces public health measures, and the entire governmental and
private public health complex. Currently, many prominent public
health mavens claim that traditional public health is changing into a
“new public health” that cooperates with medicine and places civil,
constitutional, and domestic and global human rights at the center of
the discipline along with concerns for maximization of the health of
populations and disadvantaged groups.8
A third justification is that the best reading of constitutional law,
medical ethics, and public health ethics shows a consensus that the
most potent public health measures should be strictly or stringently
reviewed to determine whether they have been shown to be necessary,
effective, and the least restrictive way to achieve vital governmental
interests.9 Meeting these proof requirements obviously requires the
previous and concurrent collection of ideas, data, and other evidence
concerning the relative safety and efficacy of public health countermeasures, and such proof, or its absence, will be considered.
This Article also discusses representative examples of “models” of
the physician-patient relationship. Models are central to, and the primary source of, medical ethics. It also discusses representative public
health ethics “frameworks” designed to address public health pandemic countermeasures. Models and frameworks all seek to reconcile
individual interests with societal or group interests. Models give priority to the individual patient, while frameworks usually focus on the
public—thus the name “public health.”10 To be sure, these perspectives are not rigid or monolithic, nor exhaustive or exclusive. They can
differ within both fields and can form bridges between one another.
They necessarily overlap in any rational social system that seeks to
further all basic values—liberty, equality, fairness, justice, and utility
(or, loosely, welfare). But each can freeze into unjustifiably hardened
ideological positions. Although some things may be clearly forbidden
8. WENDY MARINER ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 18 (3d ed. 2019).
9. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII and sections VIII.B–C, IX.E. Regarding enhanced constitutional judicial review of actions intruding on personal liberties,
see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Parts VI, VII for analysis of models and frameworks.
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or required, others require taking a powerful multiplicity of relevant
variables into account. In some hands, starting with a presumption in
favor of liberty, delay pronouncements are the bottom-line results of
determining that societal needs outweigh individual needs. Also, without being reductive, “society” is a partial function of aggregate individual needs, taken one at a time. A society or corporate entity is not just
people added up, but it does not exist, except as a shell, without people
(or robots).
Additionally, this Article explores whether clinical medicine and
public health are in fact separate spheres, examines pertinent legal
and ethical precepts in those putative spheres to determine whether
the two fields necessarily clash, and searches for analogous principles
from both spheres that protect individuals from overly invasive public
health measures. The discussions of medical and public health law
and ethics elucidate the deep and principled respect for the physicianpatient relationship in medical law and ethics; the circumscribed nature of any exception to this reverence that requires consideration of
societal or third-party interests; the opposing fealty in public health
law and ethics to population and group health under, most prominently, utilitarian calculations—it is primarily public health actors
who stand behind the push for delay pronouncements and other severe pandemic countermeasures, although they have virtually ignored
the former but paid attention to the latter. Analysis of whether medical and public health ethics are separate spheres requires brief reference to the interactions among bioethics, clinical ethics, and public
health ethics.11 These fields can be useful in studying, analyzing, advocating for, or adopting medical and public health law and ethics,
and placement among the three can affect the approach of writers and
shape readers’ and listeners’ receptivity to analyses. Although there is
a tension between clinical medicine and public health, this Article ultimately finds that there is common ground with respect to the high
degree of scrutiny that should be applied to review at least delay orders and any other equally intrusive public health interventions.12
Studying delay pronouncements is, in the patois of this Article, a
“macro-triage” problem.13 An example of macro-triage is deciding who
should get scarce medical resources between a large and possibly nation-wide group of those who are seeking care that supposedly can be
delayed, on one hand, and a larger national group of current and future COVID-19 patients. (A COVID-19 patient could be in both
groups.) Macro- and micro-triage are distinct. Micro-triage involves
one scarce resource distributed to one of two or a few patients. It is
11. See infra note 84 for discussion of bio-, medical, and public health ethics.
12. See infra Part X (regarding common ground between medicine and public health).
13. Here, macro-triage is used to indicate allocation of an array of scarce medical
resources among large groups.
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usually implemented by a committee populated by a small group of
professionals and laypersons. Macro-triage involves an array of medical resources that might be weighed differently, and it is promulgated
and issued by professional bodies or, more commonly, governmental
officials—in the case of COVID-19, it was primarily state governors.14
Macro-triage is the many against the few, micro-triage is the few
against the few. This Article will only allude to micro-triage insofar as
it informs the study of macro-triage and delay.
A roadmap: Part II discusses criticisms and situations that demonstrate how delay directives can be very damaging. Part III is a hypothetical medical malpractice case involving the implementation of
orders and recommendations representative of the actual pronouncements surveyed in Part IV. Part V explores a tension between traditional medicine and public health. This includes discussion of the
respective fields’ traditional opposing perspectives and of the possible
coordination of their concerns and concepts under a “new public
health.” This new field is arguably deeply concerned about population
health and constitutional, human, and civil rights of individuals in domestic and global venues. Part VI is devoted to medical ethics, and
Part VII covers public health ethics. Part VIII studies medical- and
public health-related laws. Part IX applies the law and ethical
precepts studied, referring to the hypothetical medical malpractice
case (which, as elaborated, contains constitutional issues). Part X contains a summary of observations and recommendations. Part XI is a
brief conclusion.
II. PROBLEMS RAISED BY DELAY PRONOUNCEMENTS
Improperly promulgated and shabbily implemented delay pronouncements can lead to morbidity and death and raise constitutional, tort, and ethical problems. Delay pronouncements can, if
properly promulgated and implemented along with an appropriate set
of accompanying public health measures, contribute to the set of measures by preserving the time of vital medical personnel and other medical resources necessary to protect health care providers and treat
COVID-19 patients. They can meet enhanced review in the COVID-19
context only if that review does not require much proof of need, effi14. Similar terminology is used in Murray G. Brown, Rationing Healthcare in Canada, 2 ANN. HEALTH L. 101, 101 (1993) (“The central theme is that dispassionate-rationing decisions throughout the healthcare system indirectly influence
micro-rationing decisions at the clinical level, which in extreme cases involve
highly emotive and value-laden choices about which patients shall, or shall not,
receive vital healthcare services.”). Macro- and micro-triage have aliases such as
“allocation” and “distribution.” MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO, ROY G. SPECE, JR., REBECCA
DRESSER & ELLEN WRIGHT CLAYTON, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS ON
BIOETHICS AND LAW 1205 n.6 (2d ed. 2003).
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cacy, or least restrictive alternative. As indicated, this Article concludes that there should be more robust scrutiny.
Potential damage can extend to persons not covered by delay pronouncements. Prominent public health authority Lawrence Gostin
predicted at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic that more people
would die from delayed or disrupted urgent care than from COVID-19
itself, and he agrees there must be checks on invasive public health
measures.15 Other prominent public health ethics authorities join
Gostin and argue that invasive public health measures should not be
implemented unless they are necessary, effective, and the least restrictive alternative.16 This showing would be difficult, especially
given the dearth of studies or analyses that show delay actions, even
within a well-conceived package of countermeasures, produce a net
benefit. Policymakers should collect data before undertaking delay
pronouncements, and one hopes data is being collected concerning
COVID-19 countermeasures. At the least, proof of efficacy and precision could lie in a study of earlier pandemics and extrapolations from
other analyses or data. The inadequacy of delay pronouncements is
suggested by the scarcity of some medical resources that delay pronouncements were designed to preserve months after they were issued. As indicated above, there are several possible less restrictive
alternatives.17
Criticisms of and litigation regarding delay pronouncements came
quickly.18 For instance, three major health care provider groups and a
15. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Responding to Covid-19: How To Navigate a Public
Health Emergency Legally and Ethically, 10 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 8, 8–12 (2020)
(“Disruptions to the health system will likely cause more deaths of persons with a
variety of urgent health needs than of patients diagnosed with COVID-19. . . . In
the areas hardest hit so far, like Seattle and New York, hospital administrators
have been canceling or postponing elective—and even some more serious—surgeries.” (footnotes omitted)).
16. Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law,
and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121 (2007); Mark A. Rothstein, From
SARS to EBOLA: Legal and Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine, 12
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227, 249, 267 (2015); James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare
Bernheim, Beyond the Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and
Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1191, 1201–02 (2003).
17. See supra text accompanying note 3.
18. A recent article argues that politics are the major reason behind stay-at-home
orders, which suggests that the same could be true of delay pronouncements. See
Lea-Rachel Kosnik & Allen Bellas, Drivers of Covid-19 Stay at Home Orders: Epidemiologic, Economic, or Political Concerns? 4 ECON DISASTERS & CLIMATE
CHANGE 503 (2020). For example, some states have tried to place certain abortions on the list of procedures that must be delayed. Michelle Bayefsky et al.,
Abortion During the Covid-19 Pandemic—Ensuring Access to an Essential Health
Service, NEW ENGLAND J. MED. e47(1) (2020). Some states’ directives specifically
included abortions as procedures that should not be delayed. See, e.g., Proclamation from Jay Inslee, Governor of Washington, 20-24: Restrictions on Non Urgent
Procedures (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proc-
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patient-plaintiff sued Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer to strike
her April 30, 2020 order extending the moratorium on elective procedures as violative of, among other theories, Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process.19 The patient-plaintiff alleged that because
of Whitmer’s order, he lost post-operative care for a left knee replacement as well as an identical surgery that was scheduled for his right
knee, leading to excruciating pain and a reduction in the hours he was
able to work.20
Highlighting the ambiguity of so-called elective care, Arizona physician Marjorie Bessel, Banner Health’s Chief Clinical Officer, commented: “Elective surgeries—they’re a little bit of a misnomer. . . .
These are necessary surgeries—they’re medically necessary surgeries.”21 Delaying medically necessary procedures risks morbidity
and mortality. The situation is exacerbated by the backlog that accrues among patients whose procedures are delayed and patients who
are hesitant to go to the hospital even for urgent problems (and presumably, future once-delayed care). Delay directives can trigger mistaken patients to delay medically necessary care.22 Delay would likely

19.

20.

21.

22.

lamations/20-24%20COVID-19%20non-urgent%20medical%20procedures%20%28tmp%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N7HLC6U]; see also B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology of Restricting Abortion During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99
(2020) (arguing abortion was “singled out for disparate treatment” during the
COVID-19 pandemic). There is a bevy of reported cases most of which have been
decided in favor of abortion defenders; a string cite would add nothing.
See Mary Anne Pazanowski, Medical Providers Sue Michigan Governor over
Shut-Down Orders, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 13, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/health-law-and-business/medical-providers-sue-michigan-governor-overshut-down-orders [https://perma.cc/Q5DE-4T45].
Complaint at 10, Midwest Inst. of Health, PLLC v. Whitmer, No. 20-cv-414, 2020
WL 3248785 (W.D. Mich. 2020). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit certified state law
questions for decision by the Michigan Supreme Court. Midwest Inst. Of Health,
PLLC v. Whitmer, No. 20-cv-414, 2020 WL 3248785 (W.D. Mich. June 16, 2020),
certified questions answered sub nom., In re Certified Questions from U.S. Dist.
Ct., W. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1 (2020).
Bob Christie, Arizona Hospitals at 83% Capacity, Elective Surgery May Stop,
TUCSON (Sept. 28, 2020), https://tucson.com/news/local/arizona-hospitals-at-83capacity-elective-surgery-may-stop/article_6b6c3ecc-0534-5518-b18ee7e9238d3295.html#tracking-source=home-top-story [https://perma.cc/2YYHEY9L]. The vague and incomplete nature of many of the directives probably contributed to attempts by governmental officials to put a moratorium on certain
abortions. These attempts have already spawned a flurry of litigation. See, e.g.,
supra note 18.
See Jana M. Craig et al., After the Surge: Prioritizing the Backlog of Delayed Hospital Procedures, HASTINGS CTR. (June 19, 2020), http://www.thehastingscenter.
org/after-the-surge-prioritizing-the-backlog-of-delayed-hospital-procedures
[https://perma.cc/Y4FW-SSQW] (explaining factors that have contributed to a
backlog of delayed procedures). It is plausible that elective patients who would
have gone ahead with their scheduled procedures will develop fear or angst that
will bring them to forego belated care.
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exacerbate racial disparities in access to health care.23 Public health
measures, such as isolation and quarantine, have had disparate effects on minority groups, which some suggest may be protected
through use of countermeasures.24 Even if so, however, the argument
for forced public health measures to protect minority populations does
not apply to delay.
Consider a case described to a New England Journal of Medicine
correspondent in April of 2020:
In late March, Zoran Lasic, an interventional cardiologist . . . was finishing
afternoon clinic when he was approached by a nurse colleague. . . . Her husband—a 56-year-old whose father died of sudden cardiac arrest at 55—had
been feeling chest pressure. The pressure radiated down his arms and occasionally to his neck and, the previous day, had been accompanied by dyspnea
and diaphoresis, making him worried enough to call an ambulance. The emergency medical technicians did an electrocardiogram, said it looked OK, and
told him to call his primary care doctor. He did, and he was advised that given
New York’s Covid-19 outbreak, it was not a good time to go to the hospital.
Now, a day later, his colleague asked Lasic, what should they do?
Nearly apoplectic, Lasic advised urgent coronary angiography, which he
performed a few hours later. The man had a thrombus extending from his
proximal-to-midleft anterior descending artery and became hemodynamically
unstable during the procedure. Nevertheless, revascularization was successful, and he was discharged the following day with preserved left ventricular
function. Lasic, describing a precipitous decline across the New York region in
patients presenting with acute coronary syndromes, worries that others won’t
be so lucky. “I think the toll on non-Covid patients will be much greater than
Covid deaths.”25

Additional problems reported to the same correspondent include:
David Ryan, chief of oncology at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH),
[said certain] patient groups worry him most. The first are the subgroup of
patients with lymphoma for whom CAR-T therapy is potentially curative.
More than half these patients receive therapy in clinical trials, many of which
have been paused amid society-wide shutdowns; even if enrollment could continue, there’s concern about the need for ICU care in a resource-constrained
system. A related concern is for patients requiring bone marrow transplants,
given their high risk of infection and potential need for ICU care.26

The United Kingdom has the same delay problem, and a range of
persons and entities report inquiries from allegedly damaged delay
patients. Cases include metastatic cancer resulting from a monthslong delay in a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) study, despite the
23. Ruqaiijah Yearby, Racial Inequities in Mortality and Access to Healthcare, 32 J.
LEGAL MED. 77, 78–79 (2011).
24. Amy Fairchild, Lawrence Gostin & Ronald Bayer, Vexing, Veiled, and Inequitable: Social Distancing and the Rights Divide in the Age of COVID-19, 20 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 55 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2020.1764142 [https://
perma.cc/TZ3D-DPXD].
25. Lisa Rosenbaum, The Untold Toll—The Pandemic’s Effects on Patients Without
COVID-19, NEW ENGLAND J. MED. (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMms2009984 [https://perma.cc/VH7B-D4GP].
26. Id.
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patient’s plea for early diagnosis and serious depression caused by delay-associated pain.27
Although economic harms are not the focus here, they are worth
mentioning because officials should consider economic harms when
deciding, legally or ethically, whether to undertake or continue delay
measures. The furloughs of health care providers and the interruption
of a substantial portion of the health care system have economically
damaged individual and institutional health care providers, leading
some to declare bankruptcy. Economic harms could have long-term effects that might bankrupt many more care providers and exacerbate
the cost and access crises in our health care system.28
To starkly illustrate how far the zeal to maximize the preservation
of population health through macro-triage can be taken, consider an
analogous micro-triage proposal issued by prominent physicians and
experts in response to COVID-19. They proposed that persons be removed from ventilators, without consent by the removed persons or
their families, in favor of different patients more likely to benefit in
terms of health and life.29 In most cases, the removed patient would
likely die immediately or in a matter of days as a result (certainly
within any one-year limitation). If so, assuming the withdrawn care is
neither “futile” nor worthless, such action would be unethical and pos-

27. Dennis Campbell, Man “Fighting for Life” After Covid-19 Crisis Delays NHS Cancer Scan, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/
jun/09/man-fighting-for-life-after-covid-19-crisis-delays-nhs-cancer-scan/ [https://
perma.cc/TC2W-ELJX]; see also John Tingle, Patient Safety in the United Kingdom After COVID-19, HARV. L. SCH.: BILL HEALTH BLOG (May 20, 2020), https://
blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/20/patient-safety-united-kingdom-nhscovid19/ [https://perma.cc/9HHP-ZH4Z] (discussing the patient safety landscape
following COVID-19).
28. Dhruv Khullar, The Coronavirus Pandemic’s Wider Health-Care Crisis, NEW
YORKER (June 29, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/
the-coronavirus-pandemics-wider-health-care-crisis [https://perma.cc/W3ZYA9Q4] (“Hospitals in Massachusetts are losing $1.4 billion in revenue per month,
and project total losses of five billion dollars by the end of July [a month away].
The Mayo Clinic alone, which runs twenty-three hospitals nationwide, is set to
lose three billion dollars this year. The American Hospital Association estimates
that, altogether, U.S. hospitals are bleeding fifty billion dollars a month during
the pandemic. The hundreds of thousands of doctors in independent practice have
more limited capital reserves, and many may be forced to shutter their operations
or merge them with others.”).
29. Ezekiel Emanuel et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of
Covid-19, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMsb2005114?query=recirc_curatedRelated_article (observing that
many authorities have argued that this would not be homicide but also noting
that, “undoubtedly, withdrawing ventilators or ICU support from patients who
arrived earlier to save those with better prognoses will be extremely psychologically traumatic for clinicians”).
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sibly murder (or another illegal homicide) under present legal
doctrine.30
III. A HYPOTHETICAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE
Here is a hypothetical that is analogous to cases mentioned in Part
II. The hypothetical facilitates analysis by providing a context for application of the legal and ethical concepts covered.
30. Valerie Kotch & Beth Roxland, Unique Proposals To Limit Liability and Encourage Adherence to Ventilator Allocation Guidelines in an Influenza Pandemic,
14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 467, 499–500 (2013) (calling for additional immunity provisions since few states provide immunity from criminal liability, and recognizing that taking a person off a ventilator without permission can reasonably
be characterized as murder); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 184 (8th ed. 2019) (“[W]ithdrawing treatment [e.g., a
respirator] from a competent patient is not morally justifiable unless the patient
has made an informed decision authorizing this withdrawal.”). This is not a treatise on murder, but a basic definition of the concept is:
The crime of murder is the killing of one human being by another that is:
intentional, . . . unlawful (as opposed to the lawful killing by a police
officer . . . ), and done with “malice aforethought.” Malice aforethought,
which is sometimes erroneously called “premeditation” (a type of malice
aforethought), describes a state of mind or actions that evidence an: intent to kill or intent to inflict very serious, or grievous bodily harm, extremely reckless indifference to the value of human life, or intent to
commit a dangerous felony (which accidentally results in the death of
another).
Deborah England, Homicide: Murder and Manslaughter, CRIM. DEF. LAW., https:/
/www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/murder-and-homicide.htm, [https://
perma.cc/699Y-9F5F] (last visited July 25, 2020). Assuming it is certain to lead to
quick death, withdrawal of a ventilator is killing of one human being by another,
without legal justification (such as rehabilitation or punishment), and with malice aforethought in the sense that it is intended because death is certain to occur.
Even euthanasia at the request of a suffering patient is said to be with malice in
the sense of intent imputed because of the ineluctable effect. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (rejecting a right to physician-assisted
suicide without specific legislative approval). I understand that there are challenges to bringing homicide cases in this context, not the least of which is the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. Separate issues arise when a criminal defendant argues that taking organs for transplant after declaration of brain
death constitutes an intervening, superseding cause, David Sweet, Annotation,
Homicide by Causing Victim’s Brain-Dead Condition, 42 A.L.R.4th 742 (1985),
when it is alleged that harm caused by treatment or mistreatment of the condition caused by the defendant breaks the chain of causation, Carolyn MacWilliam,
Annotation, Homicide Liability Where Death Immediately Results from Treatment or Mistreatment of Injury Inflicted by Defendant, 50 A.L.R.5th 467 (1977), a
physician withdraws life support from a comatose patient, Gregory Sarno, Annotation, Homicide: Physician’s Withdrawal of Life Support from Comatose Patient,
47 A.L.R.4th 18 (1986), or a physician administers pain-killing medication sufficient to induce unconsciousness to a terminally ill patient when that might
hasten death, Sedation to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care, AM. MED. ASS’N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/sedation-unconsciousness-endlife-care# [https://perma.cc/JQX2-BFQN] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020).
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Hypothetical: Patient Sam saw his cardiologist, Dr. Williams, on
February 28, 2020. Dr. Williams charted: “history and current condition—history of hypertension, diabetes, a smoker, increasingly obese,
and elevating chest pain.” Sam was scheduled for a March 25, 2020
coronary angiogram at the General Hospital & Clinic. On March 15,
2020, the governor of Sam’s state issued an executive order stating
that physicians and medical institutions in the state should cancel
and indefinitely defer all non-essential elective invasive procedures.
“Non-essential invasive procedures” were defined as those procedures
scheduled in advance because they do not require an emergency medical procedure. This order remained in effect through July of 2020. Noting that the definition of procedures that should be canceled and
deferred was extremely broad, the hospital furloughed 100 doctors—
including Sam’s cardiologist Dr. Williams.
Dr. Hughes oversaw General Hospital’s response to COVID-19. He
occupied a high administrative position, but he did some clinical work.
He was so busy, given the pandemic, he neither created a protocol requiring that physicians have thorough discussions with each patient
subject to delay, nor demanded non-furloughed doctors communicate
with the prior physicians to gather data pertinent to urgency determinations. Dr. Hughes agreed that there should have been a protocol
and that it should have included these requirements. He did distribute a memorandum saying that physicians making urgency determinations should consider the needs of current and future COVID-19
patients.
Before the furloughs and while walking Sam and his wife to the
exit of the facility, Sam’s wife asked Dr. Williams why he had scheduled the angiogram when he did. The doctor replied, “We’ve been putting it off too long and cannot wait another three months.” The doctor
did not chart any such statement, and Sam’s wife did not recall it for
several months because she was in high anxiety over the COVID-19
imbroglio. Dr. Williams did not chart anywhere the urgency he perceived about the angiography. Only two of eight cardiologists were not
furloughed, and they were assigned to work from home with access to
patient records through a patient portal. Their responsibilities included reviewing furloughed doctors’ patient charts to check whether
those patients needed “expedited” care.
One of the non-furloughed cardiologists, Dr. Burton, reviewed
Sam’s records in light of professional association guidelines the hospital instructed him to use when determining whether re-assigned patients required expedited care. He determined the angiogram was
elective although he could have communicated with Dr. Williams and
further investigated ambiguity in the guidelines concerning patient
classifications. Cardiologist Burton then sent Sam a patient portal
message (a common provider amenity that allows both physicians and
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patients to send messages, and patients to access their own records
digitally) that his angiography was canceled and would be rescheduled. The hospital also mailed Sam an identical note. Three months
went by without any additional communication with Sam. Sam suffered a fatal heart attack three months after cardiologist Burton reviewed his records. Do the hospital and physicians have any civil
liability?31
IV. DELAY MANDATES, ORDERS, REQUESTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS32
Describing a representative sample of the early COVID-19-inspired mandates or recommendations to delay by canceling or indefinitely suspending elective, voluntary, non-urgent, or non-essential
care might be tedious.33 The goal, however, is to give summaries that
provide both a feel for the ambiguity and terseness of these pronouncements and background information that will facilitate understanding when examining their use legally and ethically. Consider
first the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) February
29, 2020, Interim Guidance for Healthcare Facilities.34 This document
recommended that—when necessary and feasible—patient health
care providers reschedule elective surgeries and shift urgent diagnostic and surgical interventions to outpatient facilities. On March 13,
2020, the American College of Surgeons (ACS) stated in its COVID-19:
Recommendations for Management of Elective Procedures:
Each hospital, health system, and surgeon should thoughtfully review all
scheduled elective procedures with a plan to minimize, postpone, or cancel
electively scheduled operations, endoscopies, or other invasive procedures until we have passed the predicted inflection point in the exposure graph and
31. Note that there can be rare instances of criminal liability. For example, New
York Mayor Bill de Blasio’s emergency order mentions the possibility of criminal
sanctions under existing law. Executive Order from Bill de Blasio, Mayor of
N.Y.C., Emergency Executive Order No. 100 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://
www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/executive-orders/2020/eeo-100.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BCF2-ZJ34].
32. For an excellent source on the substance and chronology discussed in this section,
see Karen S. Sealander et al., How To Handle Elective Procedures and Surgeries
During the Covid-19 Pandemic, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, LLP: INSIGHTS BLOG
(Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.mwe.com/insights/how-to-handle-elective-surgeriesand-procedures-during-the-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/MKG4-VQEA].
33. Such vague terms were used in many of the pronouncements, while some ameliorated ambiguity by listing of specific situations and procedures. See discussion
supra Part IV.
34. Interim Guidance for Healthcare Facilities: Preparing for Community Transmission of COVID-19 in the United States, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Feb. 29, 2020), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85502 [https://perma.unl.cc/N2BYDJPQ].
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can be confident that our health care infrastructure can support a potentially
rapid and overwhelming uptick in critical patient care needs.35

The next day the Surgeon General retweeted ACS’s recommendations,
asked that they be followed, and pointed out that each elective surgery
performed potentially brings COVID-19 to facilities, consumes protective equipment, and enervates personnel who could otherwise devote
time to treating COVID-19 patients.36 Thus, within a two-week period, three major health care offices issued parallel delay/shift/cancel
recommendations.
Additional professional groups, federal and state government, and
the White House Task Force issued mandates or recommendations in
March 2020. There is ongoing monitoring of these pronouncements as
well as of lapses of or new and modified orders or requests.37 Spikes in
what was, as of August 2020, the first wave of COVID-19 prevalence
occurred in virtually every state and engendered additional mandates
or requests that raise the issues discussed here. These issues will also
arise in future pandemics.38
Governmental mandates issued in mid-March of 2020 include: (1)
A March 15, 2020 Order of the Massachusetts Department of Public
35. COVID-19: Recommendations for Management of Elective Surgical Procedures,
AM. COLL. SURGEONS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.facs.org/covid-19/clinical-guidance/elective-surgery [https://perma.cc/39XM-NC9Y]. The ACS subsequently released detailed guidelines pertinent to individual care categories. Local
Resumption of Elective Surgery Guidance, AM. COLL. SURGEONS (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.facs.org/covid-19/clinical-guidance/resuming-elective-surgery
[https://perma.cc/37DB-D9PW].
36. Jerome Adams (@Surgeon_General), TWITTER (Mar. 14, 2020, 5:07 AM), https://
twitter.com/Surgeon_General/status/1238798972501852160.
37. For a full listing of the early March 2020 pronouncements, see Sealander et al.,
supra note 32. Regarding subsequent developments, see Dena Bunis & Jenny
Rough, List of Coronavirus-Related Restrictions in Every State, AARP (Mar. 4,
2021), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/info-2020/
coronavirus-state-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/RYZ6-52JS]; Tiffany Kung,
How Doctors Are Keeping Patients Safe as Elective Surgery Resumes, ABC NEWS
(May 2, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/doctors-keeping-patients-safe-elective-surgery-resumes/story?id=70316383 [https://perma.cc/7CRG-44XQ] (“Approximately 20 states have resumed elective surgeries . . . .”); Muriel Bowser,
Phase 1 Guidance: Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) Guidance for Elective Surgery,
GOV’T D.C. (May 26, 2020), https://coronavirus.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/
coronavirus/page_content/attachments/COVID-19_DC_Health_Guidance_for_
Elective_Surgery_Reopening_DC_2020.05.26_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HLT3-8CVP]; States with Elective Medical Procedures Guidance in Effect, AM.
COLL. RADIOLOGY (May 18, 2020), https://www.acr.org/-/media/ACR/Files/
COVID19/States-With-Elective-Medical-Procedures-Guidance-in-Effect.pdf
?la=en [https://perma.cc/96Z9-CVL6].
38. See Eli Y. Adashi & I. Glenn Cohen, A Legislative Blueprint for the Next Pandemic, JAMA HEALTH F. (July 24, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/channels/
health-forum/fullarticle/2768924 [https://perma.cc/S7D9-JEW7] (noting failure to
prepare for COVID-19 pandemic in light of clear warnings and speaking to need
for legislation to deal with coming pandemics).
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Health requiring that all hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers
create and implement procedures and guidelines regarding non-essential invasive procedures.39 (2) The next day, New York’s mayor
promulgated an Executive Order directing all hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers in New York City to cancel or postpone all elective surgeries that may be canceled or postponed based on patient risk
starting March 20, 2020.40 (3) The next day, the Director of the Ohio
Department of Health ordered that non-essential or elective surgeries
and procedures that utilize PPE should not be conducted.41 (4) On
March 19, 2020, Alabama’s Governor mandated that “[a]ll elective
dental and medical procedures shall be delayed, effective immediately.”42 (5) The same day, Colorado’s Governor promulgated an Executive Order suspending “all voluntary or elective surgeries or
procedures, whether medical, dental, or veterinary, until April 14,
2020[,] at the earliest.”43 (6) Also that same day, Washington’s Governor issued a Proclamation, which stated:
I hereby prohibit all hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities, dental, orthodontic and endodontic offices in Washington State from providing health care
services, procedures, and surgeries that, if delayed, are not anticipated to
cause harm to the patient within the next three months, with exceptions and
as provided below. This does not include outpatient visits delivered in hospital
based clinics. . . .
....
. . . The above prohibition does not apply to the full suite of family planning
services and procedures or to treatment for patients with emergency/urgent
needs (examples of the latter include, but are not limited to, people with heart
39. Order from Monica Bharel, Comm’r, Massachusetts Dep’t of Pub. Health, Order
of the Commissioner of Public Health (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/
march-15-2020-elective-procedures-order/download [https://perma.cc/32NHL26Q].
40. See de Blasio, supra note 31 (mentioning the possibility of criminal sanctions
under existing law).
41. Order from Amy Acton, Dir. of Health, Director’s Order for the Management of
Non-Essential Surgeries and Procedures Throughout Ohio (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/wcm/connect/gov/e7cee147-0f86-438b-ae1fc5922f46c47c/Director%27s+Order–on-essential§urgery+3-17-2020.pdf
?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE.
Z18_M1HGGIK0N0JO00QO9DDDDM3000-e7cee147-0f86-438b-ae1f-c5922f46c
47c-n3GxdDg [https://perma.cc/J979-4AZX].
42. Governor Ivey Issues Statement on Statewide Public Health Order, OFF. ALA. GOVERNOR (Mar. 19, 2020), https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2020/03/governor
-ivey-issues-statement-on-statewide-public-health-order/ [https://perma.cc/
NNM4-T7CC].
43. Order from Jared Polis, Governor of Colorado, Executive Order D 2020 009: Ordering the Temporary Cessation of All Elective and Non-Essential Surgeries and
Procedures and Preserving Personal Protective Equipment and Ventilators in
Colorado Due to the Presence of COVID-19 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://
www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files/inline-files/D%202020%20009%20
Ordering%20Cessation%20of%20All%20Elective%20Surgeries_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6B9G-4ALE].

2021]

DELAY, DISRUPT, LIABILITY

167

attacks, strokes, or motor vehicle accidents). Hospitals and ambulatory surgical facilities may perform any surgery that if delayed or canceled would result
in the patient’s condition worsening (for example, removal of a serious cancerous tumor or dental care related to the relief of pain and management of
infection).44

(7) The next day, Florida’s Governor signed an Executive Order
prohibiting “any medically unnecessary, non-urgent or non-emergency
procedure or surgery which, if delayed, does not place a patient’s immediate health, safety, or well-being at risk, or will, if delayed, not
contribute to the worsening of a serious or life-threatening medical
condition.”45 (8) On March 19, 2020, Michigan’s Governor issued an
order listing medical and dental procedures that must be postponed
and specifying that emergency or trauma-related procedures not be
postponed where delay would significantly affect the health, safety,
and welfare of patients.46 (9) Finally, that day Vermont’s Governor
directed doctors to postpone “all non-essential adult elective surgery
and medical and surgical procedures” in the most efficient and safe
way.47
Once again, additional orders and requests were issued but are not
covered here.48 The various orders and requests (including those
listed above) describe the care that should be postponed as “elective,”
“non-essential,” “non-urgent,” “non-medically necessary,” “voluntary,”
and like terms. They all necessarily contain ambiguities—some more
than others—and only some explicitly call for case-by-case determinations.49 But the uncertainties are often excessive. Two examples of ex44. Inslee, supra note 18.
45. Order from Ron Desantis, Governor of Florida, Executive Order Number 20-72:
Emergency Management—COVID-19—Non-Essential Elective Medical Procedures (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/
EO_20-72.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX2U-REXZ].
46. Gretchen Whitmer, Executive Order 2020-17, Temporary Restrictions on Non-Essential Medical and Dental Procedures, STATE OF MICH. OFF. GOVERNOR (Mar. 19,
2020), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522451-,00.html [https://perma.cc/8T6X-VQPA].
47. Order from Philip B. Scott, Governor of Vermont, Addendum 3 to Executive Order 01-20: Suspension of All Non-Essential Adult Elective Surgery and Medical
and Surgical Procedures (Mar. 20, 2020), https://governor.vermont.gov/sites/scott/
files/documents/ADDENDUM%203%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20ORDER%200120.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQX5-B2GA].
48. See sources cited supra notes 32, 37 and accompanying text.
49. For example, an April 7, 2020 recommendation by the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services called for a case-by-case analysis to place patients in one of
three tiers of acuity: low, intermediate, or high. Non-Emergent, Elective Medical
Services, and Treatment Recommendations, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(Apr. 7, 2020) https://www.cms.gov/files/document/cms-non-emergent-electivemedical-recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6K2-BXC9]. The American College of Surgeons posted even more detailed guidance to facilitate individualized
judgments. COVID-19: Guidance for Triage of Non-Emergent Surgical Procedures, AM. COLL. SURGEONS (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.facs.org/covid-19/
clinical-guidance/triage [https://perma.cc/4KHP-K5AM].
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cessively ambiguous “definitions” come from the Massachusetts and
Colorado pronouncements. Massachusetts’ order defines “non-essential elective invasive procedures” as “scheduled in advance because
they do not require an emergency medical procedure.”50 This can be
read to cover an overly broad scope of procedures. Colorado’s mandate
defines “voluntary or elective surgeries or procedures” as those that
“can be delayed for a minimum of three months without undue risk to
the current or future health of the patient.”51 There is no attempt to
explain “undue risk” (e.g., specifying the probability and magnitude)
or the use of “three months” as the minimum length of delay (maybe
there should not be a timetable). The Colorado mandate does, however, call for hospitals to promulgate specific guidelines.52
V. THE TENSION OR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
TRADITIONAL CORE MEDICAL AND PUBLIC
HEALTH LEGAL AND ETHICAL PRECEPTS
The traditional view is that medicine focuses primarily on individual physician-patient relationships, with some circumscribed consideration of societal or third-party interests, while public health is
preoccupied with populations and vulnerable groups.53 Proponents of
a “new public health,” such as scholar of health law, policy, and management Wendy Mariner and her colleagues, reject this dichotomy,
stating: “People in public health traditionally distinguished their field
from medicine by emphasizing that physicians treat individual patients while public health practitioners treat entire populations. This
distinction is rapidly blurring.”54 Before COVID-19, supporters
pointed to the ways that public health has moved its focus away from
interventions to curb the spread of pathogens such as influenza as evidence of the blurred boundaries between medicine and public
health.55
To be sure, there is some coordination between medicine and public
health. But this melding process is a work in progress that scholars
have not fully studied. If anything, the COVID-19 pandemic and what
it portends have shown that those in public health have not and
50. See Adashi & Cohen, supra note 38.
51. See Polis, supra note 43.
52. Id. Ambiguous governmental pronouncements could be challenged on due process
vagueness and lack of notice grounds under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
53. See, e.g., James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 170, 171 (2002); Michael Keeling & Oliver Bellefleur,
“Principlism” and Frameworks in Public Health Ethics, QUE., CAN. NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. HEALTHY PUB. POL’Y (Jan. 2016), http://www.ncchpp.ca/docs/
2016_Ethics_Principlism_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BFS-HY8F].
54. MARINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 13.
55. Id.
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should not move away from curbing the spread of pathogens as a core
of public health. The pandemic might, in fact, further divide medicine
and public health by posing and portending more emergencies that
present even more contentious issues concerning the many against the
few. For example, physicians and the institutions that employ them
may be bitter about the COVID-19-related financial hit, bankruptcies,
mass furloughs, and directives to function outside specialties.56 Similarly, patients whose care is delayed or disrupted might resent these
moves and lose trust in the public health field or government
generally.
Biomedical ethics scholar James Childress and his eminent colleagues offer a more accurate description of the relationship between
medicine and public health than Mariner:
How can we distinguish public health from medicine? While medicine focuses
on the treatment and cure of individual patients, public health aims to understand and ameliorate the causes of disease and disability in a population. In
addition, whereas the physician-patient relationship is at the center of
medicine, public health involves interactions and relationships among many
professionals and members of the community as well as agencies of government in the development, implementation, and assessment of
interventions.57

Academic and practice-oriented perspectives place importance on
the coordination of medicine and public health, but significant tension
remains because of the contrast between medicine’s traditional focus
on individual patients or research subjects and public health’s customary emphasis on populations and groups. Nevertheless, coordination
of medicine and public health—and their respective law and ethics—
each borrowing descriptive and prescriptive concepts from the other is
essential. As an example of the beneficial effects of coordination, I will
show how both medicine and public health can combine to provide
substantial and equivalent legal and ethical protections to individuals
subjected to delayed care.
Analyzing the intersection of medical and public health law and
ethical perspectives in any setting is complicated by the numerous
takes from authorities in both spheres.58 A full analysis of these nu56. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. This illustration is not intended to
deny that many clinicians worried over the delays but thought they were necessary under certain conditions. See, e.g., Louise P. King & Sigal Klipstein, When
and How To Resume Non-Urgent Care During COVID-19, HARV. L. SCH.: BILL
HEALTH BLOG (May 6, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/06/
non-urgent-care-covid19-reopening/ [https://perma.cc/5Q3G-D8XV]; Karen Weise
et al., The Coronavirus Is Forcing Hospitals To Cancel Surgeries, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/coronavirus-covid-surgeries-canceled.html [https://perma.cc/KN7X-24HH].
57. Childress et al., supra note 53, at 170.
58. See infra Part VI (explaining the multiple ethical theories and models of the physician-patient relationship that have been linked to bioethics and clinical re-
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merous views would require a book. Here, I focus on medical and public health law and ethics as they pertain to the delay and disruption
issues and in an analysis of medical models of the physician-patient
relationship and public health frameworks fashioned for the study of
public health pandemic or catastrophic emergency measures.59 The
delayed care or interruption of physician-patient relationships context
has been neglected even though it magnifies the putative clash between medical and public health law and ethics.60
Assuming that, at the least, public health and medicine are distinct legal or ethical spheres, there is an equal, central, and over-arching issue of reconciling powers, rights, and interests of the population
with those of the individual.61 One important related question in
medicine is whether a physician can or should consider cost and general access to health care when making decisions concerning administration of high-cost, low-benefit treatments. There are various
answers to this question, but they, at most, tolerate relatively limited
consideration of societal and third-party interests (as in warning
others of dangerous patients).62
The mandates and recommendations discussed above (and issues
and concepts discussed below) demonstrate the tension between medical and public health law and ethics. In some instances, however, the
public health mandates and requests studied here do show regard for
individuals already within a physician-patient relationship. An example is the Colorado Governor’s Executive Order mentioned above insofar as it demands that specific guidelines be created, presumably to
protect patients who might be harmed by delay.63 Likewise, many
public health analyses contain ethical principles that can be invoked
to protect individual patients because it is difficult for the regulated
individual to win against the public. An example is Childress’s argument, when analyzing Gostin’s framework for dealing with
pandemics, that the burden of proof should be placed on those who
seek to impose coercive, invasive public health measures64 because it
is difficult for the regulated individual to win against the public. This
is consistent with a moral-social-political tradition that allows one to

59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.

search ethics); see also infra Part VII (discussing different frameworks for public
health ethics).
Other public health measures such as isolation and quarantine will be addressed
insofar as they link to or provide guidance regarding delay.
The magnifying factors include intrusion on the physician-patient relationship at
the core of medical ethics; the severe and coercive measures that are part of the
menu of countermeasures; the individual and population focus of medicine and
law, respectively; the chance for physical harm or death; and harm to the medical
system judged by cost, quality, and access.
See infra Parts VI, VII.
See discussion infra Part VI.
See supra Part IV; Polis, supra note 43.
Childress & Bernheim, supra note 16, at 1194.
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develop a presumptivist approach to reconciling liberty with governmental interests and eschews an absolutist or contextualist stance.65
This Article ultimately shows that medical law, medical ethics, public
health law, and public health ethics can all involve contributions from
each other. They can combine to protect patients from shoddy promulgation or implementation of delay pronouncements. There are especially strong synergistic relationships involving constitutional law in
both spheres.
VI. MEDICAL ETHICS
Laws concerning medical liability, constitutionality of medical regulatory actions, immunities from liability, admissibility of evidence in
legal proceedings, and state medical board discipline are informed by
medical ethical principles. The law and ethics have reciprocal relationships. The medical ethical principles most applicable to the delay pronouncement interruption of physician-patient relationships come from
a rich literature exploring the ethical requisites associated with the
physician-patient relationship. More than that, discussion of the physician-patient relationship was and is at the core of medical ethics in
the thick sense.66 This examination of medical ethics focuses on ethical models of the physician-patient relationship, which is salient in
how these models favor individual patients and carefully circumscribe
consideration of societal and third-party interests.67 Writings about
these models could, with proper foundation and court approval, serve
as a foundation of experts’ ethical or legal opinions.68
Physicians and scholars Ezekiel Emanuel and Linda L. Emanuel
have discussed several models of the physician-patient relationship.
The Emanuels define models as ideal types that might not reflect any
particular physician-patient relationship and state neither legal nor
ethical minimums; stripped of such considerations they can inform ei65. See id. at 1201–02. Childress is a leading authority in bioethics, clinical medical
and research ethics, and public health. Gostin and Berkman agree with placement of the burden of proof on the government. See Gostin & Berkman, supra
note 16, at 148 (“A policy that entails personal burdens and economic costs is only
justified if the government can demonstrate that there is a reasonable chance of
protecting the public health. Because it is extremely difficult to exactly define
‘reasonable chance’ for all potential situations, the government has the burden of
proof and has to engage in ongoing evaluation of the public health intervention
and its effectiveness.”). The Gostin and Berkman argument is not as developed as
the one by Childress and Bernheim, but the reference to ongoing research regarding efficacy is very important. Throughout, there will be discussion of the government’s constitutional and ethical duty to show need, efficacy, safety, and minimal
intrusiveness of public health measures that trench on liberty.
66. Childress et al., supra note 53.
67. See discussions infra subsections VIII.A.1–2, 4–5.
68. 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE, § 9:9 (7th ed.
2020).
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ther the legal or ethical decision-making.69 They are higher than the
law but not above it. There are four primary models: “First is the paternalistic model, sometimes called the parental or priestly model. . . .
Second is the informative model, sometimes called the scientific, engineering, or consumer model. . . . The third model is the interpretive
model. . . . Fourth is the deliberative model.”70 The Emanuels focus on
four aspects of physician-patient relationships: (1) the goals of the
physician-patient interaction, (2) the physician’s obligations, (3) the
role of patient values, and (4) the conception of patient autonomy.71
The models illuminate what it means to favor or respect individual
patients and suggest limited ways in which physicians can urge patients to consider societal or group interests.
Applying the four aspects of the physician-patient relationship, the
models’ respective views are:72
Informative

Interpretive

Deliberative

Paternalistic

Open to
development
and revisions
through moral
discussion

Objective and
shared by
physician and
patient

Elucidating and
interpreting
relevant patient
values as well as
informing the
patient and
implementing
the patient’s
selected
intervention

Articulating and
persuading the
patient of the
most admirable
values as well
as informing the
patient and
implementing
the patient’s
selected
intervention

Promoting the
patient’s wellbeing
independent of
the patient’s
current
preferences

Conception of Choice of, and
patient’s
control over,
autonomy
medical care

Selfunderstanding
relevant to
medical care

Moral selfdevelopment
relevant to
medical care

Assenting to
objective values

Conception
Competent
of physician’s technical
role
expert

Counselor or
advisor

Friend or
teacher

Guardian

Patient
values

Defined, fixed, Inchoate and
and known to conflicting,
the patient
requiring
elucidation

Physician’s
Obligation

Providing
relevant
factual
information
and
implementing
patient’s
selected
intervention

69. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221, 2221 (1992).
70. Id. at 2221–22. The Emanuels also refer to an instrumental model, in which the
physician acts to further her own interests, as a paradigm of what should be prohibited. Id. at 2222.
71. Id. at 2222.
72. Id. at 2222 tbl.1.
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The Emanuels conclude that although different models might apply to different circumstances and each has its faults, the ideal model
in terms of respecting the patients’ interests and autonomy is the deliberative model.73 They give six reasons for this choice:
First, . . . . [f]reedom and control over medical decisions alone do not constitute patient autonomy. Autonomy requires that individuals critically assess
their own values and preferences; determine whether they are desirable; affirm, upon reflection, these values as ones that should justify their actions;
and then be free to initiate action to realize the values.
Second, . . . . [t]he ideal physician . . . is a caring physician who integrates
the information and relevant values to make a recommendation and, through
discussion, attempts to persuade the patient to accept this recommendation as
the intervention that best promotes his or her overall well-being.
Third, the deliberative model is not a disguised form of paternalism. . . . [L]ike the ideal teacher, the deliberative physician attempts to persuade the patient . . . not to impose those values . . . .
....
Fourth, physician values are relevant to patients and do inform their
choice of a physician.
Fifth, we seem to believe that physicians should not only help fit therapies
to the patients’ elucidated values, but should also promote health-related values. As noted, we expect physicians to promote certain values, such as “safer
sex” for patients with HIV or abstaining from or limiting alcohol use.
Finally, . . . . we must shift the publicly assumed conception of patient
autonomy that shapes both the physician’s and the patient’s expectations
from patient control to moral development.74

The Emanuels’ only illustration regarding consideration of societal
or third-party interests demonstrates that only the deliberative model
allows urging a breast cancer patient to enroll in a research study because, in light of uncertainty as to the best treatment, it is within her
best interests and also furthers a tradition of women participating in
research trials to benefit future generations of breast cancer patients.75 The informative model allows bare mention of the research
study, while the paternalistic and interpretive models do not mention
the study.76
Roy G. Spece, Jr. and David S. Shimm proffer a “good citizen”
model.77 It is a complementary, over-arching ethical construct that
links other models applicable to direct physician-patient interactions.
The good citizen model allows circumscribed consideration of societal
and third-party interests. Invoking various ethical theories and con73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 2225.
Id. at 2225–26 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2223.
Id. at 2222–23.
Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David S. Shimm, Discovering the Ethical Requirements of
Physicians’ Roles in the Service of Conflicting Interests as Healers and as Citizens,
in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 42, 52 (Roy G.
Spece, Jr., David S. Shimm & Allen E. Buchanan eds., 1996).
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cepts as well as constitutional and other law that might inform ethical
analysis, they summarize:
The [good citizen] physician always occupies this role, regardless of the model
that characterizes his direct interaction with specific patients. As a citizen,
the physician must act for the good of specific third parties or society when the
patient poses a threat of disproportionate harm. What constitutes ‘disproportionate’ harm is an ethical judgment concerning the principle of justice . . . .78

What is required of the citizen physician is indicated by the examples of when doctors should draw the line and conclude that proposed
care is disproportionate given the overall problem of access to medical
care and the duties of administrative physicians. As to disproportionate care, Spece and Shimm observe that although the individual patient comes first and should be given the benefit of any doubt,
physicians are ethically required or allowed to forego marginally beneficial and highly costly care—at least when there is disclosure.79 Similarly, the law requires them to breach patient confidentiality to
protect society from grave harms such as physical attacks and infectious diseases. Concerning administrative physicians such as institutional managers, utilization reviewers, and quality assurance
monitors, they conclude that such persons can have primary duties to
patients depending upon the precise circumstances.80 This view was
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id. Relevant cases concern the duties of treating doctors and third-party decisionmakers such as insurers and their personnel. In Wickline v. California, 239
Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), a Medi-Cal utilization review doctor refused to grant the treating doctor’s request for eight extra days of hospitalization
but did grant a four-day extension. In language that was arguably dicta, the court
reasoned: “Third party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or
implementation of cost containment mechanisms.” Id. at 819. In Wilson v. Blue
Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), a mental patient was covered
by Alabama Blue Cross, which delegated its authority to California Blue Cross,
which itself retained Western Medical as a utilization reviewer. The latter denied
coverage for the decedent’s hospitalization, and the court determined that Western Medical could face liability because the patient may have lived had he completed the recommended hospitalization. Id. at 883. The court held that language
in Wickline, which could be read to place sole responsibility on the discharging
doctor if his decision caused injury, was dicta. Id. The appellate court reversed
the lower court’s award of summary judgment because there remained questions
of fact as to whether it was proper for utilization review to be pursued and
whether Western Medical played a role in causing the decedent’s death. Id. at
883–85. In Murray v. UNMC Physicians, 282 Neb. 260, 272, 806 N.W.2d 118, 126
(2011), the defendants decided to delay the administration of an expensive drug
until it was approved by the insurer, and the court found that they did not violate
the standard of care because the decision to wait was based on a reasonable medical judgment that it would be harmful to the patient if the drug were started and
then withdrawn if the insurer ultimately denied coverage. In Mintz v. Blue Cross,
92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 427–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), an insured patient sued a
healthcare insurance policy administrator for denying coverage of an experimen-
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adopted in a report of the American Medical Association’s House of
Delegates.81
There are approaches that apparently oppose any physician consideration of societal or third-party interests unless imposed by law,
and ones that give great weight to such interests.82 The representative models by the Emanuels and Spece and Shimm’s models of the
physician-patient relationship indicate that the individual patient
should be the presumptive winner when her interests clash with
broader interests, and only in rare circumstances must (or can) there
be consideration of societal or third-party interests.83
VII. PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS
This Part will briefly address public health ethics generally and
public health frameworks crafted by eminent public health authorities
to ethically judge pandemic countermeasures. There is a substantial
body of writing on public health ethics that draws, to a certain extent,
on the longer-existing literature concerning medical ethics and
bioethics. There is disagreement about the relationship between
bioethics and public health (or among those and clinical ethics).84

81.

82.

83.
84.

tal cancer treatment, alleging negligence and interference with his contract with
the insurer. The court held that Wilson did not apply to the latter claim because
interference was not relevant there. Id. at 432. As to negligence, however, the
court observed: “[A] claims administrator owes a duty of due care to members of a
health care plan to avoid physical harm to plan members resulting from its administration of benefits under the plan, and accordingly Blue Cross’s demurrer to
Mintz’s cause of action for negligence should have been overruled.” Id. at 428.
At the recommendation of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, the AMA
House of Delegates adopted the following statement:
Physicians in administrative and other nonclinical roles must put the
needs of patients first. At least since the time of Hippocrates, physicians
have cultivated the trust of their patients by placing patient welfare
before all other concerns. The ethical obligations of physicians are not
suspended when a physician assumes a position that does not directly
involve patient care.
AM. MED. ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES PROCEEDINGS: 46TH INTERIM MEETING 189
(1992).
Compare id. (endorsing a restrictive approach), with Jessica Mantel, A Defense of
Physicians’ Gatekeeping Role: Balancing Patients’ Needs with Society’s Interests,
42 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 725 (2015) (supporting a more liberal approach in which
physicians have dual duties, one to patients and another to society).
See supra Part VI.
Ronald Bayer & Amy L. Fairchild, The Genesis of Public Health Ethics, 18
BIOETHICS 473, 473 (2004) (“As bioethics emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and
began to have enormous impacts on the practice of medicine and research . . .
little attention was given to the question of the ethics of public health.”). Public
health ethics became a subject of serious study at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, and there exists a deep divide between bioethics, which focuses on
the individual, and public health ethics, which focuses on society. Id. at 474–75;
see also Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1776 (2001) (proposing a six-step framework to analyze the ethics of pub-
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Once again, the concern at this point is with frameworks that can
guide public health on the ground; might be admitted, considered, or
relied on in court or policy making venues; and, for research or practice purposes, give the reader a feel for how those in public health
approach public health ethics. These frameworks are improved if they
are linked to and draw on ethical theories and concepts familiar to
philosophers.85 Public health frameworks are not accompanied by definitions of “framework.” They can be analogized to models in medical
ethics. This Article considers frameworks as structures for ethical
analysis. Although they contain more than the bare bones, these
frameworks are not completed works consisting of precise ethical theories or finely grained context-situated arguments.
Public health ethics attends to the core problem of reconciling societal and individual interests. It has, however, a thread of primarily
utilitarian analyses of societal health, and another strain that could
be considered diametrically opposed that invokes specific civil liberties
or human rights as expressed in global or regional declarations or covenants or in domestic law and constitutional rights.86 Arguably, a
turn to human rights at the global level that involves consideration of
individual interests of entire populations in other countries should be
at the core of public health ethics.87
One might argue that the two strains of utilitarianism and civil,
constitutional, and human rights are inconsistent. The apparent contradiction can be explained, at least below the global level. The rights
lic health measures); Childress et al., supra note 53, at 170 (distinguishing and
relating medical ethics and public health ethics); Lisa M. Lee, Public Health Ethics Theory: Review and Path to Convergence, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85 (2012)
(explaining that although public health initially drew upon the principles of
bioethics, the two are different because bioethics focuses on the individual patient
and her relationship with a physician, whereas public health focuses on populations protected by many mostly non-medical actors); Steven S. Coughlin, How
Many Principles for Public Health Ethics?, 1 OPEN PUB. HEALTH J. 8, 8 (2008)
(asserting that public health professionals should participate in identifying the
“ethical and moral philosophic underpinnings” of public health); Keeling & Bellefleur, supra note 53 (surveying literature on this topic and arguing for categorizing public health ethics as a part of bioethics). The scope of bioethics itself is
contested. Some define it seemingly to encompass ethical analyses applied to any
living entity or its environment. Michael Shapiro and Roy Spece define it as the
fragmentation and reassembly of vital life processes and concepts that pose
fraught ethical questions that might not be amendable to traditional descriptive
and normative analyses. SHAPIRO, SPECE, DRESSER & WRIGHT CLAYTON, supra
note 14, at 5–11.
85. See, e.g., Andrew W. Siegel & Maria W. Merritt, An Overview of Conceptual Foundations, Ethical Tensions, and Ethical Frameworks in Public Health, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS 5, 5–7 (Anna C. Mastroianni et al.,
eds., 2019).
86. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 16, at 249–50 (discussing utilitarianism).
87. See supra text accompanying note 9; see also Gostin & Berkman, supra note 16
(discussing international human rights principles regarding public health).
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spoken of are most needed by populations or groups who are subject to
harm because of racial, economic, or political vulnerabilities. The
goals are to protect these populations and groups, maintain public
trust, and promote domestic and global cooperation. Utilitarian calculations can consider these “individual” public health interests, just as
medical ethics can employ utilitarian theories when considering individual rights. Childress and Bernheim insist that individual rights
have a place within communitarian values.88
Moving from general comments to frameworks applicable in pandemic or emergency circumstances, this Article briefly describes and
analyzes three representative frameworks. One is that of Mark Rothstein. In his relatively recent article, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and
Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine, Rothstein develops an
ethical framework that addresses pandemics.89 Though focused on
quarantine, it is of utility in analyzing all burdensome pandemic countermeasures and is the most helpful framework to use in the context
of analyses by courts, medical and public health authorities and practitioners, and policy wonks. Another framework, discussed below, is
that of Gostin and Berkman, which agrees with Rothstein’s important
requirements for judging public health measures—proving need, efficacy, and use of the least intrusive alternative. But it is not developed
enough to be applied by courts, medical and public health practitioners, or policy makers, at least within the delay context. Childress and
Bernheim supply yet another framework for judging public health
measures. It too supports the requirements stated by Rothstein, but in
the context of criticizing a different Gostin and Berkman framework,
not discussed here. While perhaps too philosophically sophisticated
and imaginative (involving many philosophical constructs and employing metaphors and rhetoric as tools of analysis) to expect use by
courts, practitioners, and policy makers, it is illuminating for academic authorities, philosophers, and students in various fields. It also
demonstrates how public health frameworks can be improved by
linkage to or use of ethical theories and concepts.90
Atypically, Rothstein seems to ground his analysis on an underlying ethical theory, in this case utilitarianism, that incorporates public
health and individual rights.91 Rothstein focuses on quarantine,
which he correctly describes as one of the most intrusive pandemic
countermeasures.92 Delay orders are unique and even more invasive
than quarantines, but most of what Rothstein says can provide in88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Childress & Bernheim, supra note 16, at 1193–95.
Rothstein, supra note 16.
See sources cited supra note 16.
Rothstein, supra note 16, at 249–50.
Id. at 254.
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sights into the former.93 Rothstein alludes to other countermeasures,
especially other forms of social distancing, and states the following regarding public health care ethics generally:
The ethical basis of public health is utilitarianism. Efforts to prevent catastrophic diseases and alleviate mass suffering provide a broad justification for
infringing on the rights of some members of the public through quarantine,
property seizure, vaccination mandates, or other public health measures. Utilitarian concerns about maximizing benefits, however, are not a blank check
for public health interventions. In the United States, with its strong libertarian tradition and its commitment to autonomy, justice, and procedural due
process, the exercise of public health authority always must be preceded by a
showing of necessity [and] minimal infringement on individual rights . . . .94

Rothstein’s justificatory conditions for assessing quarantine include: “(1) necessity, effectiveness, and scientific rationale; (2) proportionality and least infringement; (3) humane supportive services; and
(4) public justification.”95 Regarding necessity, effectiveness, and scientific rationale, Rothstein explains:
“Necessity” means public health officials ought to impose quarantine only in
the face of a demonstrable threat to public health.
....
As with any public health measure, quarantine should not be invoked unless the best available scientific evidence indicates it is necessary and likely to
be effective in controlling the epidemic.
....
To be effective, a quarantine must be part of a scientifically compelling,
overall strategy for battling the outbreak of infectious disease.96

As to proportionality and least infringement, Rothstein states:
“Proportionality” means the public health response is appropriate in light
of the threat; in other words, there is a reasonable relationship between the
burdens and the expected benefits.
....
Deciding whether quarantine is necessary and, if so, determining the appropriate length of quarantine, are only the first steps in tailoring quarantine
to the specific public health conditions. Additional considerations include the
type of quarantine . . . . The overall goal should be to adopt the least burdensome means necessary to accomplish the desired public health objective. Using narrowly tailored public health measures also leads to greater public
support for the entire range of public health interventions needed in an
epidemic.
Quarantine planning should focus on the totality of effects on individuals
and society, not merely on the projected effects on infection rates.97
93. This is especially true regarding constitutional analysis because the intrusion involved in quarantine is of a high order, much above what the U.S. Supreme Court
has required for strict scrutiny. See infra text accompanying notes 168–69.
94. Rothstein, supra note 16, at 249 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 250–53 (footnotes omitted). Rothstein appears not to have considered that
his ethical analysis might be used by persons formulating or interpreting laws,
including constitutional law.
97. Id. at 254, 261 (footnotes omitted).
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The conditions thus far, also embraced by the other two frameworks
discussed in this Part, are the ethical equivalent of constitutional
strict or intermediate scrutiny. These ethical and constitutional requirements can each inform the other.98
Concerning humane supportive services, Rothstein observes: “In
quarantine at home, food, medicine, and other supplies and services
must be provided to people who are unable to leave their homes. . . . In
monitoring the health status of the individuals in quarantine, public
health officials need to strike a balance between public health and individual liberty.”99 From an ethical perspective, and by parity of reasoning, patients subject to delayed medically necessary procedures,
even if not physically injured or otherwise holding a legal claim,
should also be given support, but in the form of monitoring, stabilizing
health care, education, counseling, and supply of essentials, if the delay causes their inability to work.
Next, consider Gostin and Berkman’s framework that antedated
Rothstein’s. It is grounded in various human rights pronouncements
that have formal status as part of international law or, as with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have become customary international law100 and addresses basic tenets of public health ethics
and specific ethical issues raised when implementing influenza pandemic countermeasures.101 The Gostin and Berkman framework is
representative but so diffuse that it can be characterized as a potpourri of issues, ideas, and concepts to think about when analyzing
public health measures.102 It does not sufficiently define the invoked
concepts, show how they interrelate to construct a framework, or apply the framework to generate outcomes. It is probably not a framework that a policy maker or court might follow or adopt when making
decisions.
98. They will be discussed when undertaking constitutional analyses in section
VIII.C.
99. Rothstein, supra note 16, at 263.
100. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 16 at 142–46.
101. Id. at 141–54.
102. Id. at 139. The potpourri includes micro-triage criteria; civic engagement/fair process; social prevention; functioning of science/medicine; functioning of the social
system and associated infrastructure (e.g., legal system, police, fire, and food distribution); medical necessity for treatment; medical need/vulnerability (often
children and elderly persons are in greatest need); intergenerational equity (raising the issue of whether years likely added to life should be used as a rationing
criterion); social justice/equitable access (including for vulnerable and disfavored
groups of people) so as to protect public trust; domestic and global human rights;
constitutional rights such as procedural justice, bodily integrity, autonomy, and
privacy; international coordination and collaboration; and global justice, including the precept, drawn from human rights, providing that “[i]f all human life has
equal value then there would be a strong moral justification for fair rationing
from a global perspective.” Id.
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For instance, one can wonder about what “fair rationing from a
global perspective” is; it could require global wealth redistribution of a
sort that most Americans might not even support domestically. A robust version of this redistribution seems impracticable and anathema
to certain core values embraced in the United States. As Rothstein
points out, public health measures demand “self-sacrifice to benefit society, but America’s public ethos of libertarianism has translated into
a historical and pervasive distrust of government, with a strong preference for self-reliance and independence.”103 To be successful, a public health agenda must be palatable to the public. Gostin and
Berkman do, as indicated, include Rothstein’s important requirements of demonstrated need, effectiveness, and least infringement.
The framework also incorporates Rothstein’s concept of an extended
research agenda, which is specifically intended to determine whether
public health interventions work, an important precept.104
In Beyond the Liberal Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and
Vision for Public Health, Childress and Bernheim establish a framework partially as a critical response to a parallel iteration of Gostin’s
framework, which is primarily set forth in his writing on terrorism
rather than pandemics.105 The article starts with a question:
How can our society respect liberty and privacy, among other values, and,
at the same time, protect public health and security? Our aim in this Commentary is to offer a deliberative framework that transcends the impasse created by overly simplistic liberal and communitarian perspectives. This
framework is designed to provide a rigorous and imaginative way to address
both individual liberty and privacy, on the one hand, and public health and
security, on the other.106

They note that their framework is one of presumption and rebuttal
and explain their link to philosophy:
Our Commentary is an exercise in applied or practical political philosophy.
Political philosophy, whether formal (e.g., a full-blown theory) or informal
(e.g., a politically-embedded framework), provides an important foundation for
and sets limits on public health law. It identifies the normative values that
should structure the relationship between the state and the individual, the
legal powers that enable officials, within defensible limits, to address public
health threats, and the processes of reflection, deliberation, and justification
that should direct the exercise of the legal powers. As a normative enterprise,
103. Rothstein, supra note 16, at 268.
104. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 16, at 140–43, 170–73.
105. Childress & Bernheim, supra note 16. Childress points out that although he criticizes Gostin’s When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations on
Personal Freedoms and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1106
(2003), he also draws on other Gostin writings, including Public Health Law in an
Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and Common Goods, 21 HEALTH
AFFS. 79 (2002), and LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH
LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (2016).
106. Childress & Bernheim, supra note 16, at 1192.
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political philosophy shares much with both moral philosophy and social philosophy even when they address ostensibly distinct spheres of life.107

They also examine different forms of balancing, the related concept of
principled versus procedural justifications for overriding individual
rights, the content of and relationship between principled and procedural justifications, and proper specification of the weight and scope of
balanced values—all endeavors in which they say Gostin falls short.
Thus, Childress and Bernheim essentially position their framework as
a critical opposition:
[A]s we have argued, Gostin’s framework, while helpful in several respects, is
problematic in others. What is required is an alternative that moves beyond
the liberal-communitarian impasse and beyond balancing liberty and public
health/security. In our judgment, such a framework must recognize that liberty is part of our communal interests, along with public health; that tradeoffs between liberty and public health/security can usually be avoided; that, in
the selection of means or measures to protect or promote the goal of public
health, there is a presumption for liberty over coercion; that this presumption
for liberty can be rebutted or overridden when several justificatory conditions
are met—effectiveness, necessity, least restrictive or intrusive means, proportionality, impartiality, and public justification; that public justification takes
place in the context of relationships that frame the meaning of public health
actions; that the appropriate use of state liberty-limiting authority must be
interpreted through the lens of the understanding and the expectations community members and public health professionals have of each other; and that
public justification, deliberation, and other relationship-building activities
may be more important for biopreparedness than state power because they
maintain and nurture civic ideals, cooperation, and trust.108

Childress and Bernheim recognize that there must be more than
broad principles to protect individual rights because public health’s
population or group perspective and purposes can allow disregard of
individual rights too easily. They more carefully describe their principles and concepts in a way that is protective of population interests
and individual rights (yet they contend, perhaps inconsistently, that
individual rights can be considered communitarian values109). Importantly, they also argue that bias in favor of the public health side in a
clash of individual liberty with community benefits justifies putting
the burden of proof on the proponents for public health efforts.

107. Id. (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 1218–19.
109. Id. at 1194.
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VIII. MEDICAL- AND PUBLIC HEALTH-RELATED
STATUTORY, COMMON, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

Medical Negligence, Malpractice, Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, Crisis Standards of Care, Abandonment, and
Informed Consent

The purpose of discussing the legal concepts in this section is to
show how the law emphasizes and respects the physician-patient relationship almost solely to protect patients.
1.

Negligence and Malpractice

A violation of the standard of care giving rise to liability for medical negligence is sometimes loosely referred to as medical malpractice.
The specific elements of a negligence prima facie case are duty, breach
of duty (an act or omission that fails to comply with the applicable
standard of care), but-for and proximate causation, and (usually physical) damage.110 There are numerous iterations of the standard of care
within and among jurisdictions. Three prominent standards are: (1)
What providers customarily do (e.g., do blood bankers customarily
omit certain screening tests); (2) What a reasonable person would do
given the circumstances (e.g., would a reasonable person not do cer110. Although often used interchangeably with medical negligence, malpractice refers
to medical negligence, rarely breach of contract, and other torts or legal causes of
action such as breach of fiduciary duty (does not require the patient to show “intent” and requires the physician to follow a higher standard than mere absence of
negligence) and a set of intentional torts—including intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, battery, and false imprisonment. Although absence of informed consent is usually judged under the standards of negligence, there are
nuances in various jurisdictions such as requiring a physician to disclose what a
reasonable patient would consider material as opposed to invoking one of the
three versions of the standard of care/medical negligence referred to immediately
below. If a physician does not even an attempt to obtain consent, battery is the
preferred tort. See JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A
NUTSHELL 3–4, 155–63, 253–60 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing medical malpractice,
battery vs. negligence, standards of disclosures in informed consent, and contracts, respectively); see also 1 DAN DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS LAW OF TORTS 7–10,
80–97, 103–14 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 1 DOBBS] (discussing contract, battery,
and false imprisonment, respectively); 2 DAN DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS LAW OF TORTS
25–26, 48–49, 549–71 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 2 DOBBS] (discussing fiduciary
duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress); 3 DAN DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS
LAW OF TORTS 638–62, 665–94 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 3 DOBBS] (discussing
fraud). Although the physician-patient relationship, even if not formalized in a
written agreement, involves an implied contract that the physician will provide
good care and the patient will be responsible for payment for that care, courts
generally force the plaintiff suing for substandard care to solely pursue a negligence cause of action. The exceptions are for agreements to achieve a specific
result, perform a specific procedure, personally provide care, or provide exceptional care (often accompanied by a requirement that the contract be written).
See KING, supra, at 253–60.
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tain screening tests); and (3) What reasonable and prudent doctors
would be expected to do. Here, custom is only presumptive or pertinent evidence, i.e., even if defendant blood banker’s expert testifies
that blood bankers customarily omit a test, other experts and evidence
will be admitted to challenge that custom—the latter given presumptive acceptance or relevance only as to what the standard of care
requires.111
2.

Fiduciary Law Applied to Physicians

Fiduciary duty concepts go back centuries and first had their primary modern use in financial and guardian-ward matters.112 Although there are various terms to describe the fiduciary relationship,
I use “principal” for the person protected by the theory and “agent” for
the person bridled by it. To use this theory in court, one has to show
how the defining characteristics of a fiduciary relationship apply to
the persons in the relationship at issue. For example, that the agent
has unique knowledge and power that places the principal in deep dependence on the agent; that the agent can provide something that is
necessary to serve vital interests of the principal (or sometimes society); and that the agent’s membership in a profession that benefits
from societal respect, economic benefits, and considerable leeway for
self-regulation calls for acceptance of a higher duty, as a quid pro quo.
This quid pro quo of a higher duty protects the principal. The parameters of the enhanced duty depend on the specific facts and where the
plaintiff sues.113
If the court has characterized a physician-patient relationship as a
fiduciary one, the physician may be held to a standard of care that is a
step above that used in negligence cases, perhaps enhancing disclosure in informed consent cases; imposing a vague duty of loyalty that
limits the scope of tolerated conflicts of interest (especially financial
111. For an illustration of these standards, see United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827
P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992) (en banc), a suit against a blood services company for transmitting HIV. The trial court held that plaintiffs’ experts could not testify because
they were not offered to opine regarding what blood banks actually do. The appellate court said the experts should have been allowed to testify because the
applicable standard was what a reasonable blood bank would do, not what blood
banks customarily did. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the experts should
have been allowed to testify because though the standard of care is determined by
customary blood bank practice, this can be rebutted by a showing the custom
itself was negligent. See also Eleanor Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical
Standards of Care, 29 J. LAW MED. ETHICS 323 (2001) (noting the plethora of
standards among “standard” standards of care and finding there “are virtually
thousands of standards of care pertaining to health-care services in the United
States today”).
112. Maxwell Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 1, 60–61 (2015).
113. Id. at 12 n.12.
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ones); requiring the physician to advocate for the patient in specific
transactions or disputes with third parties (e.g., insurers); limiting
when or how the physician can consider societal and third-party interests; requiring the physician to take some risk to further the patient’s
interests; once the plaintiff shows that there is a fiduciary relationship, switching to the physician the burden of proving there was no
breach; or allowing recovery for dignitary harms.114
Maxwell Mehlman has thoroughly analyzed the fiduciary duty
question. He has also surveyed the authorities (court opinions, restatements, legal treatises, scholarly articles, and monographs) that
address whether physicians have fiduciary duties. His analysis concludes “yes.”115 Mehlman found the authorities split but attributed
the naysayers’ views to erroneous readings of prior analyses, confusion between law and equity, misguided policy objectives, and reasoning errors.116
Mehlman affirmatively supports his conclusion in favor of medical
fiduciaries first, by establishing that the physician-patient relationship “obviously” meets the requirements of fiduciary relationships.
Second, he argues recognition frees the patient from having to pay
monitoring costs and conserves the ability to pay for additional care.
Third, the fiduciary relationship is essentially embraced in authorita114. See id.; Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (refusing to recognize conversion cause of action but holding that patient stated a cause
of action based on fiduciary duty or informed consent because health care provider defendants failed to disclose their financial interest in using patient’s cells
to create valuable medical resources); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782
A.2d 807, 817, 858 (Md. 2001) (Researchers performed non-therapeutic research
on minors—for which their parents were held unable to consent—and the court
concluded: “We hold that there was ample evidence in the cases at bar to support
a fact finder’s determination of the existence of duties arising out of contract, or
out of a special relationship, or out of regulations and codes, or out of all of them,
in each of the cases.” The court did not use the label “fiduciary,” but its reasoning
parallels that in Moore and shows how common law, statutes or regulations, constitutional principles, and ethical precepts can coalesce to create legal duties.);
Spece & Shimm, supra note 77, at 57 (explaining that even an employer-hired
physician has a fiduciary duty to provide a letter stating his findings as to why an
employee cannot work when the refusal to provide such evidence will lead to the
employee not being able to work or collect on disability insurance).
115. Mehlman, supra note 112, at 15. Mehlman uses the terms intrustor and fiduciary, not principal and agent.
116. Id. Some authorities accept a quasi-fiduciary theory. See Tanya J. Dobash, Note,
Physician–Patient Sexual Contact: The Battle Between the State and the Medical
Profession, 50 WASH. LEE L. REV. 1725, 1746 (1993). Mehlman provides reasoned
rejections of arguments that even if a fiduciary duty exists, it is contained within,
and thus is redundant to, negligence; that it can support requiring physicians to
ignore societal and third-party interests (including controlling the overall cost of
care); that it is superfluous because any concern about patient exploitation is expiated by disclosure; and that it unfairly imposes a vague, capacious duty on
physicians.

2021]

DELAY, DISRUPT, LIABILITY

185

tive pronouncements by organs of the American Medical Association
(AMA). Fourth, it allows physicians to advocate for their patients—
even if it that poses limited costs or risks. Fifth, it gives physicians a
tool with which to fight excessive private and governmental restraints
on their choices in favor of patients’ interests.117
This Article accepts all the arguments Mehlman makes except the
proposition that physicians should never consider foregoing possibly
marginally beneficial care, even when there is no significant patient
interest at stake. As discussed above, this Article accepts such socalled rationing at the bedside, subject to the conditions just mentioned, with the additional requirement that any close calls should be
decided in favor of the patient.118 One justification for rejecting fiduciary duty is that it supposedly prohibits physicians from considering
societal or third-party interests, such as the overall cost of health care,
when making decisions about individual patients.119 However, this is
not true because a fiduciary relationship’s primary effect is to assure
that physicians do not place their own interests before those of their
patients, and various laws command physicians to protect certain
third parties by, for example, reporting venereal diseases and gunshot
wounds and by warning others about dangerous patients.120
Now I turn to a truly murky concept that threatens harm to physician-patient relationships—“crisis standards of care.”
3.

Crisis Standards of Care

Crisis standards of care is a confused concept. The gist is that in a
declared emergency, health care providers’ usual loyalty to individual
patients switches to populations or groups. This raises questions concerning when, where, how much, and in what manner crisis standards
take effect. Crisis standards of care are, roughly, between ordinary
standards of care (discussed above) and immunities from liability. Immunities (e.g., ones applicable to manufacturers of drugs in an emergency) completely or partially bar suits against the person or entity
protected by the immunity.121 Although immunities are numerous
117.
118.
119.
120.

Mehlman, supra note 112, at 53–63.
See supra text accompanying notes 77–82.
Mehlman, supra note 112, at 31–37.
Cf. Mantel, supra note 82, at 725–26 (“This Article . . . argues for a dual duty of
care, with physicians permitted to balance the individual patient’s needs with
society’s interest in constraining health care costs and ensuring the equitable allocation of limited medical resources. So, while patient loyalty would remain an
important value, the physician’s fiduciary obligations to patients would be limited by the physician’s competing obligations to society. Therefore, law and medical ethics should be reformed to accommodate physicians’ dual duty of care.”).
121. MARK HALL ET AL., MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 467–79
(3rd ed. 2013); see, e.g., Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP)
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d–6e. The PREP Act is an example of a federal immunity
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and important, they are beyond the scope of this Article except as a
baseline for judging crisis standards of care. This baseline standard, if
applied to the liability-creating conduct discussed here, undercuts efforts to deter sloppy promulgation or implementation of delay pronouncements and to achieve other purposes of tort and other laws.122
If there were adequate specifications as to the precise applicability,
scope, and nature of crisis standards of care, they would be properly
characterized as limited immunities. The almost invariable vagueness
of crisis standards of care means that health care providers practically
never can count on them to change the standard of care in negligence
or other cases. Nevertheless, there have been articles, pre- and postCOVID-19, focusing on the micro-triage aspects of crisis standards of
care. There, one might find adequate specification to guide the parties
and the court.123
Regardless, as George Annas has persuasively argued over many
years and in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, crisis standards of
care (and the overlapping idea of triage protocols as evidence that
health care providers were not negligent) are not useful and are based
on false premises. Specifically, crisis standards of care: (1) are based
on the false premise that physicians will avoid providing care in emergencies; (2) are incoherent and have not given any guidance to health
care providers (this might not be true concerning micro-triage decisions); (3) marginalize informed consent and its firm foundation in our
common and constitutional law (the patient is not informed about her
that applies to certain conduct within the COVID-19 pandemic. It allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services in declared emergencies to, through declaration, shield persons who prescribe, administer, or dispense pandemic
countermeasures (mainly medical products) “from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of,
relating to, or resulting from the administration to, or the use by, an individual of
a covered countermeasure.” Id. at § 247d-6d(a)(1).
122. KING, supra note 110, at 327–28.
123. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR
CATASTROPHIC DISASTER RESPONSE (Dan Hanfling, Bruce M. Altevogt, Kristin
Viswanathan & Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2012); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Practical, Ethical, and Legal Challenges Underlying Crisis Standards of Care, 41 J.L.
MED. ETHICS 50 (2013); Nancy Berlinger et al., Ethical Framework for Health
Care Institutions & Guidelines for Institutional Ethics Services Responding to the
Coronavirus Pandemic, HASTINGS CTR. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.thehastings
center.org/wp-content/uploads/HastingsCenterCovidFramework2020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U8SP-Q4PC]; Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability
and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913 (2008); Emily
Cleveland Manchanda et al., Inequity in Crisis Standards of Care, 383 NEW ENG.
J. MED. e16 (July 23, 2020), https://www-nejm-org.libproxy.unl.edu/doi/10.1056/
NEJMp2011359 [https://perma.cc/BTK4-JNV5]; see Gostin & Berkman, supra
note 16; Govind Persad, Arizona’s Crisis Standards of Care and Fair Allocation of
Resources During COVID-19, HARV. L. SCH.: BILL HEALTH BLOG (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/06/arizonas-crisis-standardscare-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/7NR6-CUUR].
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diluted protection); (4) falsely assume that clinicians’ ethics will rapidly change from the focus on physician-patient relationships and duties to individuals to a utilitarian focus on populations; and (5) are
unnecessary because the definition of negligence among jurisdictions
invariably includes the concept that unreasonableness must be judged
in light of the particular circumstances. As to incoherence, Annas
argues:
There is a reason for the generality of this standard [moving focus on the
individual victim to a population/group orientation]: it can be applied to every
medical specialty, every medical decision, and each environment in which
medicine is practiced. The alternative is to have a different [specified] standard of care for each medical specialty, each decision by the specialist, and
each environment in which the specialist is practicing. But having each physician and each drug or device they are using come with its own “[crisis] standard of care” detailing indications, dosages, methods of administration, etc., is
an incoherent and unworkable arrangement of circumscribed rules.124

I accept Annas’s arguments and note they reject that crisis standards of care are necessary to allow physicians to act properly in
emergencies. Crisis standards of care also, similarly to outright immunities, undercut the purposes of tort law such as fairness, compensation of victims, deterrence, cost-spreading, and moving resources to
their highest use through internalization of external costs.125 This Article now presents another theory—abandonment—that advances
these purposes.
4.

Abandonment

Abandonment is, primarily, a species of medical negligence. The
justification for discussing it separately from negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty is that both sides might exploit its nuances to potentiate the negligence and fiduciary theories or use it to independent
advantage. If the court accepts abandonment as a distinct theory, it
may provide distinct benefits, even as a tort of medical negligence. For
instance, in the hypothetical above, Sam’s widow would have an emotional advantage if allowed to use the damning abandonment label.
Also, abandonment is exceptional because, given its simple elements,
it can easily be conceived not to require expert testimony. Specifically,
there is no need for an expert when the patient can make a simple
showing that a physician terminated (or interrupted) an ongoing physician-relationship without giving the patient sufficient notice so she
could arrange alternative treatment, preferably after the existing physician helps her find or refers her to appropriate doctors. Abandon124. George J. Annas, Rationing Crisis: Bogus Standards Unmasked by Covid-19, 20
AM. J. BIOETHICS 167, 167–69 (2020); George J. Annas, Standard of Care—In
Sickness and in Health and in Emergencies, 362 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2126,
2126–31 (2010).
125. KING, supra note 110, at 327–28.
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ment can also apply if there is notice but no reasonable alternative
health care provider or treatment.126 At the discretion of the court, a
jury can determine if these conditions are met and if the patient suffered damages, such as the untreated condition obviously becoming
worse, without the help of an expert.127
Some authorities identify two genres of abandonment: knowing
termination of the physician-patient relationship and termination in
the sense that the physician unreasonably failed to determine that additional treatment was necessary.128 (Both versions could apply to the
hypothetical.) These authorities also claim that abandonment can be
based on breach of an implied agreement (contract) to not abandon the
patient.129 The vast majority of authorities state that abandonment is
presumptively embedded in negligence. Some authorities claim that
abandonment is based on negligence and actually contains an additional prima facie case requirement that the termination of the relationship occur at an especially important moment.130 (The urgency of
Sam’s angiogram could fulfill any such requirement here.) If the physician’s abandonment is extreme and outrageous and causes serious
emotional upset, the patient can sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress and possibly obtain punitive damages.131
A situation roughly analogous to our hypothetical was addressed in
Ascher v. Gutierrez, where the defendant-anesthesiologist left an operating room when asked to consult regarding another operation.132 The
abandoned patient had serious complications that needed immediate
attention, and the patient died.133 The court held that a physician’s
primary duty is to his immediate patient and that he should not abandon the patient without assuring an adequate replacement.134 In our
126. Angela R. Holder, Physician’s Abandonment of Patient, 3 AM. JUR. PROOF FACTS
§ 1 (2020); 2 DOBBS supra note 110, at 158–62 (“The standard, or perhaps a rule
of law, also requires that the physician will not abandon treatment of the patient.
However, not every failure to attend or treat is an abandonment. Abandonment
occurs only if the physician terminates needed service without adequate notice
and without arranging for appropriate treatment by other qualified health care
providers.”).
127. See Holder, supra note 126; 2 DOBBS, supra note 110, at 193–201. It is possible
but less achievable to forego experts in other, usually more complex, medical negligence contexts.
128. See Holder, supra note 126; 2 DOBBS, supra note 110, at 161–62.
129. See Holder, supra note 126; 1 DOBBS, supra note 110, at 7–10.
130. Holder, supra note 126; C.T. Dreschler, Annotation, Liability of Physician Who
Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R. 432 (2020); Andrade v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 707
S.E.2d 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that abandonment at critical stage
constitutes negligence).
131. See Tuttle v. Silver, 21 Pa. D & C.4th 271, 274–76 (1993); Grimsby v. Samson,
530 P.2d 291, 295 (Wash. 1975); HALL ET AL., supra note 121, at 323–24.
132. Ascher v. Gutierrez, 533 F.2d 1235, 1236–37 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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hypothetical case, the defendants (and government, if sued) might
have actually caused a situation in which the needed alternative care
is not available.
5.

Informed Consent

A legal theory cutting across negligence, abandonment (in
whatever form), and various intentional torts is informed consent. The
two most common informed consent claims are negligence, with varying standards of care, and battery (usually when there is no attempt
to obtain consent).135 The requirements to support a claim based on
failure to obtain informed consent are a patient with capacity, absence
of duress, breach of duty by not meeting the standard of care regarding disclosure, causation, and (usually physical) damages that are
linked to the non-disclosure (with rare exceptions to the link demand).
As to causation, it can be split into two additional requirements: factual, or but-for, cause—the patient would have refused or acted otherwise if there had been disclosure—and, rarely omitted, legal, or
proximate, cause—a reasonable patient would have refused or acted
otherwise if there had been disclosure. Concerning the disclosure
duty, jurisdictions are equally split regarding the standard of disclosure between a physician-oriented standard—under the general standard of care in the jurisdiction—and a patient-oriented standard—
what reasonable patients, or rarely, the plaintiff herself, would consider material to their decision-making.136
6.

The Effect of Private and Governmental Orders and Requests

The COVID-19-driven mandates and recommendations outlined
above are pertinent to civil liability. Insofar as they contain requirements to protect existing patients, are governmental mandates, and
meet criteria imposed by legal rules, when not complied with they can
have several effects. First, they might list specific sanctions.137 Second, if a hospital or physician intentionally or unreasonably does not
follow a clear and reasonable order, such as an order to promulgate
internal guidelines concerning delay actions, and that order is clear
and reasonable, it can establish negligence per se, create a presumption that there has been medical negligence, or serve as relevant evidence for the trier of fact.138 In the reverse, mandates also apply to
defendants using compliance with mandates and recommendations to
justify their conduct. Third, any of the mandates or recommendations
might be used as foundation for a plaintiff’s or defendant’s expert’s
135.
136.
137.
138.

See 2 DOBBS supra note 110, at 158–62.
Id.
See de Blasio, supra note 31.
FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 68.
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opinion regarding the standard of care.139 Fourth, if issued from, say,
a specialty college, board, or association, those organizations might
impose their own sanctions, which might include dismissal from the
group.140 Fifth, any discipline by a college, board, or association might
also be considered in state medical board disciplinary proceedings.141
B.

Public Health Laws that Authorize Coercion To Achieve
Maximum Benefits for Populations and Groups

Much of public health law sets forth substantive and procedural
rules concerning use of coercive techniques that can be implemented
to deal with infectious pathogens, bioterrorism, and other emergencies. These laws authorize public officials to, among other countermeasures, isolate people carrying an infectious agent; quarantine
individuals exposed to “infected” individuals; close facilities (whole
businesses, other endeavors, and even entire cities or states); set curfews; test (individuals); screen (groups and populations); in some cases
impose mandatory treatment or immunization; restrict travel; require
social distancing; require health care providers (individuals and institutions) to delay care of patients in existing physician-patient relationships to conserve health care resources for dealing with the
emergency; and even, to some extent, force health care providers to
treat certain ill patients. Most of these and more have been carried out
during the COVID-19 pandemic.142 Once again, the exercise of power
to delay care usually gets no more than a passing reference in the
literature.
139. This requires that the document is of the type customarily and reasonably relied
upon by experts. See id.
140. See, e.g., Bylaws: VII Maintenance of Fellowship and Membership, AM. COLL.
SURGEONS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.facs.org/about-acs/governance/bylaws#s71[https://perma.cc/PG8Q-Q9WZ] (describing the procedures for discipline,
discontinuance, and termination of fellowship).
141. The rules of evidence are sometimes relaxed in state medical board proceedings.
See Laura J. Spencer, Comment, The Florida “Three Strikes Rule” for Medical
Malpractice Claims: Using a Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard To
Tighten the Strike Zone for Physician Licensure Revocation, 28 ST. LOUIS UNIV.
PUB. L. REV. 317, 322 (2008). Covering discipline by professional groups or state
medical boards is beyond the scope of this article.
142. Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, and Local
Responses to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, at 10, 18
(S. Burris, S. de Guia, L. Gable, D.E. Levin, W.E. Parmet & N.P. Terry eds.,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3675780 [https://
perma.cc/RHF3-W968] (referencing numerous federal guidance and state orders
as well as actions by 850 counties and 500 cities, including social distancing, stayat-home, closing businesses and schools, barring large gatherings). See generally
supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text (regarding measures and rights they
trench on).
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Constitutional Analyses

Constitutional analysis is important in both clinical medicine and
public health. The central issue in both contexts is how deferential the
courts will be. The early answer in public health was very deferential,
despite the fact that public health measures can trench on the kinds of
fundamental rights or important personal liberties that prompt the
Supreme Court to apply strict or invigorated scrutiny. The landmark
case on this issue is the Court’s 1905 decision, Jacobson v. Massachusetts.143 Jacobson was fined $5 for refusing to be vaccinated against
smallpox. My reading, one among other reasonable ones, is that the
Court adopted a deferential default rule that is currently known as
the rational basis test, almost equivalent to no scrutiny.144
All of the Court’s statements except one cry “extreme deference” in
public health cases: (1) “There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good;”145 (2) “[I]n every
well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of
its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may
at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such
restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the
general public may demand;”146 (3) It was for the legislature to choose
between the views that vaccinations are efficacious or not, and such
choices concerning health, public morals, and safety that are embod143. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
144. It is beyond the scope of this Article to relitigate the issues of constitutional judicial review and Court capacity, but I accept enhanced review in cases involving
personal liberties. For arguments pro and con, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at
727–29 (detailing the contours of rational basis review). The following arguments
might have to be rethought if our political system continues its chaos. Some arguments against judicial review are that it is anti-democratic, that the political
branches are better situated to determine moral, empirical, and medical/scientific
questions, that the Court does not have the time or resources to hear many cases,
that history and the text of the constitution cut against the notion, that it violates
federalism and separation-of-powers principles, and that it cuts off political and
civil discourse. See, e.g., Gil Seinfeld, Eighty Years of Federal Forbearance: Rationing, Resignation, and the Rule of Law, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 155, 157, 162–64
(arguing that the Court retains relevance and maintains the rule of law through
judicial review within the context of federalism); ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE
CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING (2019) (arguing that capacity in the form of lack of time is a primary driver
regarding judicial review and that it interacts with other concepts calling for judicial restraint); Michael Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–6, 66–67 (1996) (noting that many scholars and
justices accept the argument that judicial review is needed “to protect minority
rights from majority over-reaching,” but this operates less often than they think);
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)
(arguing that active judicial review is only appropriate when persons cannot protect their rights in the political process).
145. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
146. Id. at 29.
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ied in law are valid unless the measure “has no real or substantial
relation to [its] objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law . . . ;”147 (4) It is
possible to construct hypothetical situations where the statute could
permit the exercise of police power “in such circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases as to justify the
interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression,” but that
is not a sensible construction of the statute and the Court does not
hold that the statute “was intended to be applied in such a case, or, if
it was so intended, that the judiciary would not be competent to interfere and protect the health and life of the individual concerned;”148 (5)
“So far as [health and safety] can be reached by any government, they
depend, primarily, upon such action as the State in its wisdom may
take; and we do not perceive that this legislation has invaded by right
secured by the Federal Constitution;”149 (6) “[N]othing clearly appears
that would justify this court in holding it to be unconstitutional and
inoperative in its application to the plaintiff in error;”150 and (7) Referring to several state cases upholding vaccination of school children
and quoting with approval to a recent New York Appellate Court opinion: “ ‘In a free country, where the government is by the people,
through their chosen representatives, practical legislation admits of
no other standard of action; for what the people believe is for the common welfare must be accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does in fact or not.’ ”151 The Court’s only hint at
stopping short of total deference is references to prohibited actions
that are “cruel and inhuman in the last degree” or “arbitrary and oppressive.”152 Although some commentators read Jacobson as offering
significant protections to individuals (the reference to inhumane care,
the fine rather than forced vaccination, the exclusion of children, and
the hint at an exception when vaccination poses extraordinary health
risks), deference to public health authorities permeates the case.153
Over the last several decades, the Court has developed a tiered set
of enhanced scrutiny standards of review between strict scrutiny and
rational basis endpoints. Some commentators believe that a deferential test is still applied in public health despite developments subsequent to Jacobson, while others argue that the developments should
and sometimes do lead to enhanced scrutiny of one sort or another
when a case involves fundamental rights or important personal liber147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 38.
Shapiro, supra note 6; Holland supra note 6; Gostin, supra note 6; Parmet, supra
note 6.

2021]

DELAY, DISRUPT, LIABILITY

193

ties such as life, privacy, freedom of movement, reproductive choice,
and autonomy of decision-making in sensitive personal and family
matters.154 The level of scrutiny in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process cases depends primarily on the nature of the
right intruded upon and the degree of the intrusion. In equal protection cases brought under the same amendments, the degree of scrutiny depends on the nature of the right or interests intruded upon by
the classification at issue, the degree of intrusion, and the suspiciousness of the classification.155
Public health measures to control COVID-19 are numerous and intrude upon even more constitutional rights and interests.156 This Article mentions rights and interests intruded upon by delay, and it
sketches the constitutional analysis of one relatively ignored fundamental right—the right to purchase health care available on the open
market. Delay also intrudes on reproductive rights (some states have
declared that certain abortions are elective procedures that should be
delayed).157 Enforcement of delay orders requires examining patients’
files, and privacy protective measures might be inadequate.158 Actual
delay can intrude on life (see the hypothetical in Part III and the metastatic cancer case in Part II), bodily integrity (invaded by denial of
treatment to prevent deterioration of one’s condition), refusal of treatment (effected through forcing the use of dependence-inducing, painkilling drugs as an alternative to delayed, medically necessary care),
decision-making concerning intimate health interests (see the decisions denied to or forced on patients discussed here as to other rights),
the right to control children’s medical care (parents might be forced to
subject their children to alternative care in the form of dependenceinducing, pain-killing drugs), freedoms of movement and travel (affected by denying travel or treatments necessary to allow ambulation),
and mental well-being (see the depression case discussed in Part II).
Public health, medical, bioethics, and general legal literature have
given attention to the several rights listed in the preceding paragraph,
albeit mostly with respect to either public health measures other than
delay or other intrusions attributable to government.159 The focus
here is on the right to purchase health care or health insurance. This
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See sources cited supra note 6.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4.
See supra notes 1, 5, 6 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 18.
Adam Schwartz, Two Federal COVID-19 Bills: A Good Start and a Misstep, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (May 28, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/two-federal-covid-19-privacy-bills-good-start-and-misstep [https://perma.cc/C46E-5AVN]
(noting deficiencies in current laws, and calling for an improved general privacy
law or at least a COVID-19 privacy law).
159. See supra notes 5, 6, 142–58 and accompanying text (regarding constitutional
analyses based on the various rights alluded to here).
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right is very specific and circumscribed. It only applies to care available in the open market and does not necessarily contain a possible corollary right of persons who have qualified for and enrolled in an
ongoing government healthcare insurance program.160
The right to purchase care does not require an exception to an existing law or regulation, as is the case with use of experimental drugs
that have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration161
or drugs like marijuana that have been declared illegal by federal or
state government.162 This right is vital (implicating health and life),
steeped in tradition, and specifically described and limited. It should,
therefore, be considered fundamental under even the strictest test for
discerning fundamental rights. That test is the one announced in
Washington v. Glucksberg:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.” Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.163

It would also qualify under other tests, including the test that requires
the right be one that allows individuals to make decisions about intimate aspects of their lives.164 The asserted right to purchase care is
vital, personal, and intimate.
Arguments against applying strict scrutiny to intrusions on a right
to purchase care include the fact that myriad governmental regulations (especially professional licensing) already demand invigorated
scrutiny; that care is allegedly only being postponed; and that existing
case law denies access to experimental or allegedly harmful or addictive “treatments.” Rebuttals are that the current delay actions can be
distinguished from other contexts in that they risk life and health;
160. I plan to explore the ancillary right in a separate article.
161. Roy G. Spece Jr., A Fundamental Constitutional Right of the Monied To “Buy out
of” Universal Health Care Program Restrictions Versus the Moral Claim of Everyone Else to Decent Health Care: An Unremitting Paradox of Health Care Reform?,
3 J. HEALTH BIOMED. L. 1, 60–72 (2007).
162. Id. at 9 & n.28, 64 & n.182 (arguing there is no right to purchase care that the
government has criminalized—e.g., marijuana); cf. Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibitions on
Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985 (2005) (“This Note . . . argues that a
law completely banning the use of marijuana will, as applied to some patients,
infringe upon an array of fundamental rights, and that substantive due process
obliges any such application of the law to survive strict scrutiny.” These are “patients who seek relief from severe, and in some cases life-threatening, physical
suffering . . . when traditional medicine utterly fails them.”).
163. 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); then quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325–26
(1937); and then quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
164. Spece, supra note 161, at 36.
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that care is postponed indefinitely, and in the interim serious deterioration or death can occur; and that the alleged rights to purchase experimental (e.g., laetrile) and illegal treatments (like marijuana) are
distinguishable as not touching access to care made available in the
open market.165
The next question is whether the fundamental right to purchase
healthcare is sufficiently intruded upon by delay to trigger strict scrutiny. Consider a comparison between the intrusion of the right to
purchase health care and the intrusion involved in Zablocki v.
Redhail,166 where the Court struck down a law that denied marriage
licenses to persons with support obligations for non-custodial children
unless individuals supplied proof that they were in compliance with
the support order and demonstrated that supported children were not
and were unlikely to become public charges.167 The Court treated the
rights to marry and to procreate as fundamental rights. Even a possibly small expense to persons who met the requirement was held to be a
sufficient intrusion to trigger strict or invigorated scrutiny.168 If such
an intrusion is sufficient to trigger invigorated review, then the risk of
serious physical and mental deterioration, and even death, associated
with delay actions is certainly a sufficient intrusion.
Even if courts recognized a fundamental right to purchase care and
found that a delay pronouncement substantially intruded upon it,
courts still might apply the rational basis or an intermediate test
rather than strict scrutiny. This is explained in the above discussion of
public health measures generally, by the deference established in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court’s tiered scrutiny approach over
the last several decades, and authorities that address the appropriate
degree of scrutiny. One consideration in choosing a standard of review
is that delay is highly intrusive compared to all or most public health
measures. The dispute might also become embroiled with the Court’s
inconsistent approach to how much deference courts should give governmental scientific experts.169
In addition to the articles reference above, authorities supportive
of invigorated scrutiny in public health cases include the Canadian
Supreme Court’s decision in Chaoulli v. Québec,170 regarding the
right to purchase private health care insurance in response damaging
165. Id.
166. 434 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1978) (distinguishing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977),
as not involving a “significant” intrusion justifying invigorated scrutiny). In
Califano, 434 U.S. at 50–52, plaintiffs challenged a Social Security Act provision
that terminated a child’s secondary benefits upon marriage unless the marriage
was between two disabled persons who both received benefits.
167. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
168. Id. at 388.
169. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
170. Chaoulli v. Québec, [2005] S.C.R. 791 (Can.).
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delays in the public health care system. Three justices relied on a constitutional analysis similar to the one currently employed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. They reasoned that a ban on access to private insurance in light of risky delays in the public program trenched on “security of the person.”171 This triggered invigorated scrutiny, requiring
that such actions must comport with the principles of fundamental
justice as demonstrated by a rational connection between the law and
its goals, minimal impairment, and proportionality.172 A fourth justice, who relied on the Québec charter alone, found that the law did
not meet a requirement of least infringement because there were alternative ways to protect the public healthcare program.173 This created a four-person majority to hold Québec’s prohibition invalid. Three
dissenters argued that the majority engaged in unwarranted enhanced review when it should have embraced a rational basis test.174
In Canada, the decision triggered a one-year period in which the government of Québec was allowed to cure the constitutional deficiency.
However, this proecedure does not invalidate use of Chaoulli as persuasive authority.175
This analysis will be continued in section IX.E below with an explanation and application of the elements of rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny to the hypothetical from Part III and to delay
generally.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 820.
Id. at 823, 826–27.
Id.
Id. at 896–99.
The subsequent history is beyond the scope of this Article. See Due Process –
Right to Medical Access – Supreme Court of Canada Holds that Ban on Private
Health Insurance Violates Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms –
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 S.C.C. 35, 29272 [2005] S.C.J. No.
33 Quicklaw (June 9, 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 677, 681–84 (2005). Readers
might also gain some insight by reviewing an earlier article in which I consider
the effect of Chaoulli on the analysis of a hypothetical law that did not allow
persons to purchase certain marginally beneficial care. That article analyzed a
regime—involving government withdrawal of marginally beneficial care from the
open market—distinguishable from the delay context in which care purchased in
the open market has been scheduled or planned, only to be deferred indefinitely.
Spece, supra note 161, at 8 n.23 (“The Court’s opinion was not definitive because
one of the Justices comprising the four-person majority relied on the Quebec
rather than the Canadian Charter, three Justice joined a dissent, two Justice did
not participate, and both Charters contain provisions allowing legislators to set
aside such rulings for a certain time period.”). The argument developed in the
cited article includes an argument similar to the one accepted by three Justices of
the Canadian Supreme Court in Chaoulli. Id.
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IX. APPLICATION OF MEDICAL- AND PUBLIC HEALTHRELATED ETHICS AND STATUTORY, COMMON, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
It will be assumed throughout this Part that the hypothetical medical liability case from Part III is a unique situation wherein the Hospital employs its physicians in house. This means that the hospital is
vicariously liable for torts committed by its doctors.
A.

Negligence

There would not be any problem if delays caused no damage. Acts
of the hospital and the physicians involved in the hypothetical in Part
III that might have caused damage include the following: First, as to
the hospital, possibly negligent acts include failing to promulgate a
proper protocol—especially in the face of the apparently vague professional association guidelines. A proper protocol could have prompted
better communication among the providers and with the patient. Second, asking Dr. Burton to rely on apparently vague professional guidelines could be an unreasonable, harm-causing action. Clearer
guidelines might have included information on how to avoid injuries—
information that could have prompted protective action. Third, personnel decisions could be harm-causing, substandard acts, furloughing too many doctors and cardiologists and directing the possibly-toofew two non-furloughed cardiologists to care for an increased load of
patients by only reviewing their medical records and applying the possibly unreasonable guidelines it supplied. If there were more providers
to take the time to be more thorough, the actual gravity of delay might
have been discovered in time to prevent Sam’s death. Fourth, giving
too much weight to the interests of future COVID-19 patients as compared to the weight given to Sam’s interests could have tipped the urgency determination in favor of the fatal delay. As discussed, when
considering the ethical conception of physician duties to societal or
third-party interests, physicians are given little discretion to deny or
delay care because its expense might affect the overall cost of health
care. If the treatment offers virtually no chance of bettering the patient’s ailments yet is extremely expensive, then the physician might
ethically deny the patient’s preferred care. It is very possible that
these ethical conceptions will guide the application of negligence law.
The care involved in the hypothetical—angiography and bypass surgery—are common, efficacious, and relatively safe when applied in appropriate circumstances. A final instance of possibly substandard
conduct that might have caused harm is failure to give sufficient information to existing patients so they could advocate that delay should
not be tolerated or seek alternative care from other providers or in
different venues. This will be further discussed when covering informed consent.
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Possibly harm-causing, unreasonable acts of Dr. Hughes include
those listed for the hospital (remember that he was high enough in the
governing hierarchy to be a contributing cause). Dr. Hughes might
claim that he has no liability because he was just an administrative
physician. There are, however, legal and ethical authorities that embrace the idea that even administrative physicians’ primary duty is to
patients.176 Dr. Williams might be found to have caused harm by not
charting the urgency of Sam’s angiography and not communicating
with Dr. Burton or Sam. Proper communication could have led to
timely care. Possible harm-causing acts of Dr. Burton include not researching to resolve the ambiguity in the guidelines provided by the
hospital (e.g., calling the office that issued the guidelines or researching on the internet). The research might have clarified the guidelines
and led to appropriate action. Dr. Burton also possibly acted unreasonably and caused harm in assuming Sam had signed up for and periodically reviewed his portal files and in not consulting with Dr.
Williams or Sam regarding the urgency of Sam’s angiogram (an offhand, brief statement to Sam’s wife does not negate causation).177
All the possibly negligent acts discussed above could be the foundation for recovery under a breach a fiduciary duty claim, especially
given the pandemic. The pandemic is upsetting to virtually everybody.
Sam’s wife was distraught and frantic. Sam had ongoing pain and
would likely have been stressed by his wife’s problems. A loyal and
reasonable provider might have attempted to learn about these
problems and help Sam to deal with them. The same physician would
presumably advocate no delay given the circumstances. It would be
especially helpful if Sam’s widow discovered that any of the providers
had financial motivations, though the chances of this are not high because the delay regime has generally been financially catastrophic for
many providers.
B.

Abandonment

Once again, consider the hypothetical. (The analysis here differs
only slightly from that in the section on negligence.) The possible defendants are the hospital and the three physicians. All the defendants
can be conceived of as abandoning the patient either intentionally or
through various acts of medical negligence—some of which are less
amenable to conception as abandonment. For instance, Dr. Burton’s
liability would likely depend on the details regarding the furlough and
capability to communicate with Dr. Williams. Recall the authority
that abandonment can consist of explicit abandonment or failing to
176. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
177. I will revisit the arguably negligent acts of the Hospital and physicians in the
hypothetical in the following abandonment subsection.

2021]

DELAY, DISRUPT, LIABILITY

199

determine that the patient needs further care. The hospital could possibly be found to have de facto abandoned Sam by asking the covering
cardiologist Dr. Burton to rely on apparently vague professional
guidelines (possibly so flawed that they portend care even worse than
doing nothing); furloughing 100 doctors (possibly leaving too few to
handle communication with patients); cutting the number of cardiologists from eight to an arguably insufficient two; and directing those
two cardiologists to care for an increased load of patients by reviewing
their medical records, communicating through the patient portal, and
using vague professional guidelines it supplied. A final instance of actionable conduct, applicable to each of the defendants, is failure to give
patients notice that delay will be implemented, why, and the criteria
for deciding who doesn’t get medically necessary, non-emergency care.
Such notice could enable patients like Sam to advocate that delay
should not be tolerated or seek alternative care. Such failure too might
be described as de facto abandonment.
Possibly negligent acts perhaps constituting abandonment by Dr.
Hughes include those listed for the hospital, given that he was high
enough in the governing hierarchy to be a contributing cause. Dr.
Hughes might claim that he has no liability because he was just an
administrative physician.178 Nevertheless, as indicated, there are legal and ethical authorities that embrace the idea that administrative
physicians’ highest duty is to patients.179 The original cardiologist,
Dr. Williams, might be found liable for negligent abandonment for
failing to chart the urgency of Sam’s angiography, and since Dr. Williams failed to chart that fact, for not communicating it to Dr. Burton.
The covering cardiologist, Dr. Burton, however, could have abandoned
Sam by canceling the scheduled angiogram; not doing research (e.g.,
calling the office that issued the delay document or researching in the
powerful libraries accessible by internet) to clear up ambiguity in the
professional guidelines; and doing nothing to assure that the patient
would be contacted before three months. For all he knew, the patient
perhaps never signed up to use the patient portal. Most institutions
provide this tool for looking at records and communicating with providers, although many persons can’t or don’t use it. Even if Sam had
signed up for and checked the portal each month, he would have found
nothing relating to what and when further care should be sought. (The
hospital could be liable for abandonment by sending an identical note
that could foreseeably lead to no care or worse.) Given that Dr. Williams felt that Sam’s angiography should not be put off at all, or assuming the abandonment took place after the three months Dr.
Williams specifically mentioned, these were especially important moments, and the “important moment” requirement would be met in ju178. See Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
179. Id.
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risdictions adopting it. None of the defendants’ conduct seems
intentional or extreme and outrageous. If on the whole helpful, the
defendants might attempt to use the professional guidelines as the
foundation of an expert opinion arguing that the guidelines were not
unreasonable and set a reasonable medical standard that the defendants met. On the other hand, the plaintiff might attempt to use the
guidelines if they are reasonable and were not met.
Of course, the acts described above could, independent from abandonment, constitute breaches of duty that simply constitute breach of
fiduciary duty or negligence under whatever iteration of the standard
of care is used.
C.

Informed Consent

When the physician-patient relationship is subject to interruption
or indefinite suspension, the health care provider must disclose to the
patient the existence of any appeals mechanisms; the nature, benefits,
risks (including the risks of contracting COVID-19) from the delayed
care whenever the care is undertaken; alternatives to the delayed care
at the time it is delayed and subsequently when the patient is likely to
have the option to have the delayed care; the reason for the delay; the
expected duration of the delay; the probability and nature of any more
than de minimis risks, especially threat of significant pain and permanent harm, that might be caused by delay; the availability and contact
information regarding, if there are any, alternative health care providers; the backlog of cases that will likely exist when the care is ultimately available; and all the foregoing regarding any reasonable
medical alternatives. To avoid the risk of coercion, the physician
should not aggressively push his patient to voluntarily accept delay; to
facilitate understanding, there should be direct communication between a physician and the patient.
Turning to the hypothetical, it contains several possibly negligent
failures of informed consent or reasonable communication. Some
courts have limited the scope for informed consent saying, for example, that it does not apply to anything but surgery. If so, there can
usually be an alternative of negligent communication, such as lack of
communication among health care providers.180 The possible liabilitycreating breaches here include the hospital’s and Dr. Hughes’s failure
to promulgate a protocol that required communication with patients
and sending a perfunctory note stating there would be a delay, Dr.
William’s failure to communicate the urgency of the angiogram to
180. See 2 DOBBS supra note 110, at 217–21 (discussing negligent communication). As
to limits on the scope of informed consent, see S. GERALD LITVIN, ET AL., 3 WEST’S
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE: TORTS, LAW & ADVOCACY § 8.7 (2019) (authority regarding informed consent applying to surgery only).
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Sam, and Dr. Burton’s inadequately giving notice of the delay via the
patient portal (which Sam might have not even read). In some jurisdictions, it would likely be adequate for the widow to show that she or
her husband would have considered the omitted information material
and that an adequately informed, reasonable patient, would have
pressured the health care providers not to delay the angiogram or
sought to have the angiogram elsewhere, which would have led to preventive therapy.181
D.

Fiduciary Duty

Applying fiduciary duty is somewhat of a wildcard. If the jurisdiction accepts the theory, possible effects of showing a breach are, again,
elevating the standard of care beyond negligence, limiting consideration of societal or third-party interests, requiring advocacy for the patient, switching the burden of proof, and allowing recovery of dignitary
damages. The particular effect(s) will depend on the authorities relied
upon, particularly in-jurisdiction precedents, and on the judge’s interpretation and application of the law. Elevating the duty beyond that
in negligence cases presents similar problems to deflating the duty
through crisis standards of care. The only difference is that physicians
who rely on crisis standards of care as a future defense take a risk
that a judge will apply an unfair standard under the fiduciary theory.
Crisis standards of care are unnecessary, potentially unfair to doctors
and patients, and disruptive of the purposes of tort law.
The across-the-board, undefined elevation of the standard of care
seems unfair to physicians and might engender over-deterrence. Limiting consideration of societal and third-party interests poses similar
vagueness problems. A heightened standard should be applied only if
it supplies specific prohibitions. Requiring that the physician place the
patient’s best interests above personal interests is administrable, especially if it is limited to prohibiting financial conflicts of interest. For
example, it might be advantageous to a physician, under existing financial incentives, to characterize certain procedures as elective. Requiring advocacy for the patient if there is a dispute, say, with an
insurance company, is perhaps required simply by negligence standards, assuming the patient’s position is correct.182 Strengthening
this effect seems fair and reasonable. Advocacy might be called for if a
181. Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting, NAT’L HEART, BLOOD & LUNG INST., https://
www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health-topics/coronary-artery-bypass-grafting [https://
perma.cc/9VEV-8BKT] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021); NIH-Funded Studies Show
Stents and Surgery No Better than Medication, Lifestyle Changes at Reducing
Cardiac Events, NAT’L HEART, BLOOD & LUNG INST. (Mar. 30, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/news/2020/nih-funded-studies-show-stents-and-sur
gery-no-better-medication-lifestyle-changes [https://perma.cc/86AZ-RHY2].
182. Spece & Shimm, supra note 77, at 57.

202

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:150

patient appeals a decision to delay and requiring physician advocacy
does not make the doctor become a witness against herself. Switching
the burden of proof if a court finds a fiduciary relationship is supported by the physician’s greater access to evidence and expertise, and
by the concept that patient interests are paramount over those of society or third parties. Certain authorities advocate for allowing dignitary damages in the informed consent context because of the
overriding importance of patient autonomy.183 This might translate to
dignitary damages for fiduciary breaches, such as delay, that interfere
with patients’ autonomy, but it is doubtful that attorneys would take
cases that only portend dignitary damages.184
E.

Constitutional Analysis

Medical ethics supports strict or invigorated scrutiny for delay in
that it flows from the physician-patient relationship models that make
the patient primary and circumscribe consideration of societal or
third-party interests.185 Public health ethics supports the same approach, given its reliance on frameworks. Major frameworks by leading public health authorities discussed here require that public health
measures be shown to focus on vital governmental interests and to be
necessary, effective, and pursued in the least intrusive way.186 Constitutional arguments can be informed by such ethical considerations as
well as by values and interests embedded in statutes, administrative
regulations, and common law rules. Among the latter are strong protections for individual patients embedded in, for example, law concerning negligence, abandonment, informed consent, and fiduciary
duties.187
As explained above, the outcome of constitutional challenges
against delay actions and other severe public health measures will be
heavily influenced by the standard of review that is chosen. It is possible that our highest court and others might apply the rational basis
test based on Jacobson and other cases that require deference to gov183. MARK HALL ET AL., supra note 121, at 217.
184. Eric Goodheart, Comment, Two Tiers of Plaintiffs: How North Carolina’s Tort
Reform Efforts Discriminate Against Low-Income Plaintiffs, 96 N.C. L. REV. 512,
528–29 (2018) (noting how limitations on damages impede attorneys’ willingness
to bring medical liability cases).
185. See supra Part VI (referencing strong ethical regard for patients in relationships
with health care providers and a presumption that their interests should prevail
when pitted against societal or third-party interests).
186. See supra Part VII (regarding public health ethical frameworks that require public health measures be shown to be necessary and effective in advancing vital
governmental interests in the least restrictive way possible).
187. See supra subsections VIII.A.1–2, 4–5 (discussing these protections).
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ernmental scientific experts.188 It can be reasonably argued, however,
that the Supreme Court would read Jacobson to require significant
protections or apply invigorated scrutiny given its doctrinal developments subsequent to Jacobson. If the rational basis test were applied,
successfully attacking delay actions would require a showing that delay actions cannot be conceived to advance legitimate state interests.189 I cannot argue here that delay actions do not conceivably
advance any legitimate state interests (one is preserving medical resources necessary to protect providers of COVID-19 care).
On the other hand, Jacobson hints at some review beyond the rational basis test, and developments in the Court’s substantive due process and equal protection doctrine over the last several decades should
lead to invigorated, if not strict, scrutiny of invasive public health
measures. Several commentators have taken this position pre- and
post-COVID-19.190 It was demonstrated above why strict scrutiny
should apply.191 At least intermediate scrutiny of some form should
apply. For illustrative purposes, I will apply strict scrutiny and the
intermediate test applied in gender discrimination cases. Strict scrutiny requires that the government prove that its actual interest, is
compelling and its action is the least intrusive way to substantially
advance the interest (sometimes described as narrowly tailored).192
188. The Supreme Court has been inconsistent regarding deference to government in
areas of alleged medical and scientific uncertainty. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE
SCIENCE AND THE LAW (2004); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND
MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 90–121 (1999). The uncertainty about uncertainty
is salient given several Court opinions on different sides of cases that have cited
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30–31 (1905), or other precedents to support the notion of deference to government in areas of uncertainty. See Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 162–64 (2007) (upholding restriction on partial birth
abortions based on deference and citing numerous cases including Jacobson);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 971–72 (2000) (striking restriction on partial
birth abortion); Id. at 952, 980–1020 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding majority did not afford deference, citing Jacobson and other precedents); June Med.
Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (striking requirement that abortion doctors have admitting privileges at hospital within thirty miles of site of abortion);
Id. at 2133–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing the need for deference in areas
of medical and scientific uncertainty); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) (denying church’s application for injunctive
relief from law prohibiting large gatherings because of COVID-19); Id. (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (invoking Jacobson in calling for deference to government attempts to control COVID-19); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016) (striking several abortion restrictions). Id. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding majority failed to allow deference because of alleged medical
and scientific uncertainty).
189. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4.
190. See sources cited supra note 6.
191. See supra section VIII.C.
192. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4; Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing
Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 296, 312 (2015) (demonstrating that strict
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The intermediate test requires that the government prove that its actual interest is important and is substantially advanced by its action—apparently supplemented (seldomly) with a requirement that
the action is shown to be necessary.193
First applying strict scrutiny, it might be found that the purpose of
delay actions is to serve political convenience rather than a weightier
government interest. If the government’s actual purpose is shown to
be concern for protection of vital public health interests including
avoidance of morbidity and mortality, it is virtually certain that such
interests would be shown to be compelling, at least if that determination is made without balancing the benefits and detriments of its action. The government’s challenge would be proving that any
compelling interests are substantially advanced by delay or that delay
is the least restrictive alternative. Reference has already been made to
the absence of proof that delay works. The less restrictive alternatives
include, again, obtaining voluntary delays; well-planned and implemented guidelines for delay; setting delay within an overall comprehensive mix of countermeasures; obtaining needed health care
providers by rearranging, recruiting, conscripting, or activating licenses for inactive or otherwise prohibited health care providers; and
insofar as the federal government is involved or can be approached for
cooperation, conquering shortage of medical resources by forcing companies to mass produce needed items. If strict scrutiny is applied, delay actions should be found unconstitutional on the current record.
The analysis under intermediate scrutiny would be similar except
that the government would only have to show an actual important interest, which it can probably do. Delay actions should still fail, however, because of inability to prove that they substantially advance the
government’s important interests.194

scrutiny requires the government to prove (1) its actual interest; (2) is legitimate;
(3) is compelling; (4) any classifications it has drawn are sufficiently precise to
allow the conclusion that they substantially advance its interests (inclusiveness
scrutiny); (5) its action substantially advances its interests without regard to
classifications drawn (substantial advancement scrutiny); and (6) its action is
necessary because it is aimed at an actual problem, that has not been dealt with
already, and that cannot be addressed in ways less burdensome on individual
rights (necessity scrutiny)); Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Most Effective or Least Restrictive Alternative as the Only Intermediate and Only Means-Focused Review in Due
Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L. REV. 111, 121–49 (1988); Roy G. Spece,
Jr., A Purposive Analysis of Constitutional Standards of Judicial Review and a
Practical Assessment of the Constitutionality of Regulating Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1294–1345 (1978) (discussing the purposes behind standards of review and ambiguities in strict and intermediate scrutiny).
193. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19.
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X. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It has been argued that, at their traditional cores, medical and
public health laws and ethics are in conflict. Medical laws and ethics
are generally based on protection of individual patients under the
mantle of the physician-patient relationship; individual rights that
consist of, or are generally based on, firm foundations in ethical models; and explicit personal liberties found in constitutional, tort, and
legal rules generally. They reflect the individualistic perspective that
seems to prevail in the United States.195 Public health laws and ethics
often require coercion to trump individual rights and are generally
based on utilitarianism and population and group protection—sometimes extending to global human rights and utilitarian calculations
that would require redistribution of wealth from Americans to all
humans.
Childress argues, and street-smarts tell us, that populations or
groups usually win when pitted against individuals, and thus the burden of proof should be placed on public health proponents.196 Nevertheless, courts should often uphold public health measures as
reflecting a proper reconciliation of societal and individual interests.
The core of public health law and ethics that favors populations might
explain why there has not been better planning for and implementation of disruptions of physician-patient relationships.197
Nevertheless, despite the clash of certain medical and public
health laws and ethical principles, many physicians involved in
clinical medicine support the public health agenda and call for solidarity, which is central in dealing with collective action problems. However, prominent public health frameworks require individual
protections that are sometimes equal to or stronger than the constitutional scrutiny applied to the most fundamental of personal liberties.198 Ironically, the lack of solidarity that allows collective action is
perhaps the primary reason the United States has been one of the
least successful advanced nations in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic as exampled by early and sustained rejection of the slight, but
effective, inconvenience of mask wearing by a significant part of the
population. This began to subside somewhat in mid-July of 2020 be195. This does not mean that society will not instinctively support some public health
measures when faced with possible annihilation.
196. Childress & Bernheim, supra note 16.
197. There has been, however, substantial guidance provided by earlier promulgation
of concepts and guidelines for what this Article has referred to as micro-allocation
problems, i.e., dealing with immediate and local problems of deciding who should
be given a specific scarce resource such as a ventilator or intensive care room.
198. Recall especially Rothstein’s framework that was analogized to constitutional
strict scrutiny and, again, Childress’s framework that puts the burden of proof on
those who seek to implement coercive public health measures.
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cause a number of states were breaking records for new cases. This
resulted in expanded mask requirements and stronger sanctions.199
A similar lack of solidarity or coordination between medicine and
public health might explain why the public and private mandates and
requests discussed in this Article relating to delay and disruption of
individual care often seem to have been created in the jaws of the pandemic rather than planned and perfected in advance of expected
scourges. The delay and disruption discussed has been virtually ignored by almost every authority cited herein.
The utilitarian, population, and group perspectives could inform
the usually loose nature of the delay mandates or recommendations
discussed above. Conversely, medical law and ethics focus on the individual and existing protections of the physician-patient relationship.
Drawing upon the best elements from medical and public health law
and ethics, this Article recounts existing, and sketches new, protections and guidelines for future mandates and recommendations to
conserve medical resources to fight pandemics or other catastrophic
emergencies. This Article has also discussed law and ethics insofar as
they might support actions by persons or families harmed by botched
delays in care. The use of the rigorous scrutiny requirements seemingly agreed upon by medical ethics, public health ethics, and legal or
constitutional concepts could support (1) damage suits against private
and governmental entities for unreasonable mistakes pertaining to
drafting or implementing mandates; (2) requests for declaratory judgments and injunctions; and (3) attacks on defendants’ attempts to invoke a governmental mandate as a complete defense, a presumptive
defense, or as some evidence of reasonable behavior.
Let’s examine one of these remedies by assuming that the widow in
our hypothetical case has filed a medical negligence claim, and that
199. Adam Taylor, How the Split over Masks Sums up America’s Chaotic Coronavirus
Response, WASH. POST (June 25, 2020, 6:13 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/2020/06/25/face-masks-america-divided/ [https://perma.cc/C7JEFAKX]; Frank Miles, Some Police in Arkansas Refuse To Enforce Coronavirus
Mask Orders Because They Lack the Manpower, FOX NEWS (July 20, 2020), https:/
/www.foxnews.com/us/arkansas-police-coronavirus-mask-orders-refuse-enforce
[https://perma.cc/KC9Y-56XH] (noting that over half the states have issued orders requiring mask wearing, that there is now clear public support for mask
wearing, and that the long-standing objections to mask wearing is attributable to
Republicans and their political leaders); Robert Gatter & Saema Mohaptra,
Covid-19 and the Conundrum of Mask Requirements, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 17, 17 (2020), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol77/
iss1/2 [https://perma.cc/2XX4-BJR7] (“This Article provides an overview of the legal and policy landscape and focuses on the potential for policing against black
Americans when mask mandates are in place. Despite the public health benefits
of mask usage, due to mask mandates likely being enforced discriminatorily, we
advise caution against mask mandates.”); Id. at 29 (explaining that if mask mandates are used, they should not be accompanied by sanctions or punitive actions).

2021]

DELAY, DISRUPT, LIABILITY

207

the defendants have invoked a mandate that required delay as a complete or partial defense. The mandate can be constitutionally attacked
because the government’s issuance of a mandate constitutes state action. The widow can attack the “mandate defense” by arguing that the
order is (1) unconstitutional; (2) supportive of negligence, abandonment, and failure to obtain informed consent as to its implementation
by the private health care providers (wanton or reckless behavior
could provide grounds for an intentional tort claim and possibly punitive damages); and (3) at odds with both medical and public health
ethics. The strongest constitutional argument for the widow is that
the order trenches on fundamental rights such as the right to
purchase and use health care insurance. If this were accepted, the proponents of the mandate would likely be subject to, and not able to
withstand, strict scrutiny.200
Plaintiffs who invoked the ethical precepts among the various medical and public health frameworks that parallel the requirements of
constitutional strict scrutiny would likely buttress their constitutional
arguments. Similarly, plaintiffs could support their arguments by
referencing existing medical malpractice law, especially negligence
and abandonment doctrine, as well as medical ethics’ insistence that
physician-patient relationships be disrupted only in extraordinary situations and pursuant to firm requirements. As to arguments that the
defendants’ conduct was below the standard of care (basically unreasonable), the plaintiff can possibly use medical and public health ethics concepts.
Among the possible non-constitutional legal and ethical requirements is the obligation that health care providers and others who promulgate and implement disruptions bear the burden of justifying
those disruptions. They must make every effort to avoid or ameliorate
disruptions. This includes giving adequate notice so patients can obtain alternative care with, if required, referral and other help from
their existing providers. If these requirements cannot be honored,
there should be a macro-triage plan that considers both existing patients and those from the at-risk population. There should also be preexisting guidelines that, if necessary, can be crafted to fit particular
pandemics or other emergencies. There should also be internal provider protocols regarding how to address delay or disruption.
If there is a delay, it must be carefully explained to existing patients, including reasonable communication of the information outlined in the above discussion of informed consent. Under the doctrine
of common law due process, there should be a chance for the patient to
express any objections and at least have some opportunity to appeal
any delay based on plausible claims of violation of common law due
200. See supra Part IX.
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process and breach of fiduciary duty.201 The appeal option must be
made known to the patient. There must be communication between
providers (both existing and replacement) and the patient as well as
between the existing providers and any new providers. Alternatives—
such as transferring the patient, personnel, and therapeutic and protective resources to other venues—must be undertaken if reasonably
feasible. Even if there is delay, the patient must be updated in a
timely fashion and provided any ameliorative care (via telemedicine
when that is adequate). If challenged, the delay must be shown, with
the best scientific evidence available, to be effective, necessary, and
the least restrictive or burdensome intervention. The patient should
have humane supportive care (such as pain control and financial support, without the requirement of filing a tort suit, if the delay causes
inability to work beyond that which would have occurred had there
not been any delay) as well as a reasonable mechanism to obtain damages caused by delay.202
XI. CONCLUSION
The Article’s recommendations and the legal and ethical precepts
underlying them illustrate the benefit of coordination between
medicine and public health and the best aspects of their respective law
and ethics to reconcile societal and individual rights and interests.
There are reciprocal relationships among the medical and public
health laws and ethics. This is despite the traditional individual versus population divide between medicine and public health. As best
conceived, medical and public health law and ethics join to provide a
reasonable mechanism to reconcile individual and population rights
and interests. They provide for strict or invigorated scrutiny insofar as
constitutional issues are concerned: strong protections against health
care providers’ unreasonable, unprofessional, or inappropriate actions
through negligence, abandonment, fiduciary duty, and informed consent theories; ethical precepts that demand enhanced protections for
patients who have relationships with physicians; and a showing that
public health measures that interfere with patients’ legal rights deal
with an actual problem, are intended to protect vital governmental
interests, actually achieve those vital interests, and do so in the least
201. Regarding common law due process, see Jane Taber & Janna King, Caught in the
Crossfire: Economic Credentialing in the Health Care War, 1994 DET. C.L. REV.
1179, 1194 n.86 (1994) (“Depending upon the type of hospital involved - i.e., public or private, the source of a due process right varies. The Fourteenth Amendment governs public hospitals, but is inapplicable, absent some form of state
action, to private hospitals. Private hospitals may, however, be governed by the
theory of common law due process.”). See supra text accompanying notes 112–15,
176–79 (concerning breach of fiduciary duty).
202. I leave to others or a later time the question whether the existing legal apparatus
provides such a reasonable mechanism.
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restrictive way possible. These strong requirements should encourage
investment in public health research to determine and improve the
efficacy and safety of various (sets of) public health pandemic countermeasures, especially including delay regimes.

